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ERIN RYAN*

Secession and Federalism in the
United States: Tools for Managing
Regional Conflict in a Pluralist
Society
This Article explores the use of federalism and secession as tools
for managing regional conflict within pluralist governance, drawing
on underappreciated features of the American experience. Epic
struggles to balance autonomy with interdependence have taken on
new urgency as dissatisfaction with globalization inspires political
cataclysms unimaginable just a few years ago—including ‘Brexit’
from the European Union and American threats to leave NATO. The
same impetus toward devolution also surfaces in heated intranational conflicts. Recent calls for secession in Catalonia, Iraqi
Kurdistan, Scotland, Québec, South Sudan, and even from within the
United States reveal multiple political contexts in which questions
have been raised about how best to balance competing claims for
autonomy, interdependence, political voice, and exit.
As devolution movements destabilize institutions once thought
impenetrably secure, scholars around the globe are tapping the
wisdom of the Westphalian and post-Westphalian worlds to better
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understand the available tools for managing these conflicts. In
support of that goal, this Article probes the American experience for
lessons on managing endemic tensions between autonomy and
interdependence in societies composed of different regional, cultural,
and ideological subcommunities. It explores American secession in
contexts familiar and controversial, from the subnational to the
national level, from the American Revolution to the Civil War and
beyond. It assesses the unique advantages of U.S. federalism for
mediating opposing forces of political entropy, which operate to pull
the component pieces of pluralist nations apart, and political gravity,
which pull them together in pursuit of common goals.
Like all systems of federalism, the U.S. model cultivates the “sweet
spot” between competing claims for local autonomy and national
interdependence, allocating sovereign authority among levels of
government where each best advances the overall goal. While the
American model is not suitable in all contexts, the availability of
nested political sites for regional expression, interjurisdictional
innovation, and negotiated governance have helped fortify the
American Union against the kinds of conflicts that can foment
fragmentation.
Introduction: Autonomy and Interdependence in Pluralist Society.. 125
I.
Secession in the United States ............................................... 128
A. Subnational Secession: Then and Now .......................... 130
B. The American Revolution .............................................. 134
C. The American Civil War ................................................ 142
II.
Federalism in the United States ............................................. 149
A. The Structure and Function of American Federalism .... 151
B. Federalism as a Strategy for Good Governance ............. 153
C. Constitutional Indeterminacy and Federalism Theory ... 158
III. Nationhood Amid Forces of Political Entropy and Gravity .. 162
A. The U.S. Model and the Alternatives ............................. 163
B. The Forces of Fragmentation and Centralization ........... 165
1. Political Entropy: Toward Disassociation ................ 166
2. Political Gravity: Toward Interconnection ............... 168
C. Suspended Between Autonomy and Interdependence ... 169
1. Regional Marginalization in Québec and
Kurdistan .................................................................. 170
2. Devolution in the United Kingdom and Spain ......... 172
D. Secession and the Morality of Inclusion ........................ 176
Conclusion: Federalism as a Sword and a Shield ............................. 178

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2775377
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2775377

RYAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

12/14/2017 8:09 PM

Secession and Federalism in the United States:
Tools for Managing Regional Conflict in a Pluralist Society

125

INTRODUCTION: AUTONOMY AND INTERDEPENDENCE
IN PLURALIST SOCIETY

T

his Article explores the use of federalism and secession as tools
for managing regional conflict in pluralist institutions of
governance, drawing on underappreciated features of the historic and
modern-day American experience. The struggle to balance competing
claims for autonomy and interdependence in governance is epic, but it
has taken on new urgency as waves of popular dissatisfaction with
globalization inspire political cataclysms that would have been
unimaginable just a few years ago. In 2016 alone, these included the
British referendum to withdraw from the European Union1 and the
election of Donald Trump to the U.S. Presidency on a platform of
disengagement from such international federations as the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).2
Yet the impetus toward devolution also surfaces in conflicts
between competing intra-national constituencies, cleaving along
regional, cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and ideological lines. In
the dominant circles of international law, secession is disfavored—
viewed as an extra-legal alternative that goes beyond the requirements
of generally accepted principles of self-determination (at least absent
gross violations, alien subjugation, international exploitation, or a
colonial context).3 Nevertheless, recent calls for secession in
Catalonia, Iraqi Kurdistan, Scotland, Québec, and South Sudan reveal
multiple political contexts in which related questions are being raised

1 Steven Erlanger, British Stun World with Vote to leave U.E., N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2016, at A1.
2 Scott Bauer, Paul Ryan Defends NATO, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 26, 2016,
1:40 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2016-07-26/in-break-from
-trump-paul-ryan-defends-nato-trade-deals (discussing reactions to presidential candidate
Donald Trump’s criticism of NATO, NAFTA, and the TPP).
3 In re Secession of Québec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 222 (Can.). The Supreme Court of
Canada reviewed the dominant international law position on when secession is justified in
its 1998 decision that Québec was not entitled to unilaterally secede—but that the rest of
Canada must do more to resolve the grievances fomenting discontent in Québec. Id.
(stating “a right to secession only arises under the principle of self-determination of people
at international law where ‘a people’ is governed as part of a colonial empire; where ‘a
people’ is subject to alien subjugation, domination or [international] exploitation; and
possibly where ‘a people’ is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to selfdetermination within the state of which it forms a part. In other circumstances, people are
expected to achieve self-determination with the framework of their existing state.”).
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about how best to balance competing claims for autonomy,
interdependence, political voice, and exit.4
In the United States, a genuine secession movement by the Alaskan
Independence Party was judicially quelled as recently as 2010,
highlighting the durability of the issue even in the modern United
States.5 And while calls for full secession are seldom given much
credence in the American political context, calls to further devolve
regulatory authority occupy hallowed positions in major American
political party platforms.6 Devolution claims, often framed in terms of
“States’ Rights,” have become customary on the political right—but
in the wake of the 2016 Presidential Election, they are increasingly
heard on the left as well.7 A group of California citizens seeking their
own independence from the United States have organized a “Calexit”
campaign, seeking a 2019 referendum on California’s exit from the
American Union.8

4

See infra Part III.
See infra notes 34–37 and accompanying text (discussing the Alaskan secession
movement).
6 See, e.g., Rayna Casey et al., A Rebirth of Constitutional Government, in REPUBLICAN
PLATFORM 2016 9, 15–16 (Bill Gribbin & Eric Ueland eds., 2016), https://prod-cdn-static
.gop.com/static/home/data/platform.pdf (pledging “to restore the proper balance and
vertical separation of powers between the federal government and state governments—the
governments closest to, and most reflective of, the American people. We encourage states
to reinvigorate their traditional role as the laboratories of democracy, propelling the nation
forward through local and state innovation.”).
7 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Rites of Dissent: Notes on Nationalist Federalism, 59 ST.
LOUIS U.L.J. 1133, 1143 (2015) (“Even the most extreme state-centric tools of federalism,
secession and nullification, have been repurposed as tools of national partisan struggle in
recent years.”); see also Charles C.W. Cooke, Post Election, Progressives are Embracing
Conservative Traditions, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com
/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-cooke-left-embraces-conservatism-20161213-story.html (discussing
progressives’ post-election embrace of federalism).
8 YES CALIFORNIA’S CALEXIT BLUE BOOK: ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT
INDEPENDENCE, YESCALIFORNIA.ORG, https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/yescali
fornia/pages/1/attachments/original/1482608371/Calexit_Book_1.1.pdf?1482608371 (last
visited Oct. 13, 2017) [hereinafter CALEXIT BLUE BOOK]. The relationship of the Calexit
movement to Russian interference in U.S. politics arose after Calexit’s early leader
decided to move from California to Russia. Madison Park, Calexit Leader Quits Secession
Effort to Make His Home in Russia, CNN (Apr. 19, 2017, 12:00 PM), http://edition
.cnn.com/2017/04/19/politics/calexit-leader-russia/. However, the movement has
continued in his wake, calling for a ballot initiative designed to “put California on the path
towards becoming a fully-functioning sovereign and autonomous nation, whether within
continued association with the United States of America, or as an independent country.”
Jim Miller, Calexit Plan is Back, but It’s Toned Down, SACRAMENTO BEE (May 19, 2017,
5:31 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article1516598
77.html (quoting the California ballot measure).
5
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As secession and devolution movements threaten to destabilize
federations once thought impenetrably secure—from the European
Union to the United Kingdom to NATO—scholars around the globe
are tapping the wisdom of the Westphalian and post-Westphalian
worlds to better understand the available tools for managing regional
governance conflicts.9 New scholarship exploring how different
nations have managed these conflicts, some more and some less
successfully, promises to broaden the perspectives of researchers,
government officials, and citizens struggling to resolve sovereignty
conflicts with full appreciation for the underlying principles they
represent.
In support of that goal, this Article shares the American experience
of devolution conflict, probing our experiments with both federalism
and secession for lessons on managing the endemic tension between
impulses toward autonomy and interdependence in societies
composed of different regional, cultural, and ideological subcommunities. It explores secession in contexts both familiar and
controversial, from the American Revolution through the Civil War,
addressing secession at both the national and subnational levels.
It also considers the development of American federalism, from a
model emphasizing vertical separation toward one that harnesses
inevitable jurisdictional overlap to cultivate opportunities for
collaborative and competitive engagement. It assesses the unique
advantages of American federalism for mediating the opposing forces
of political entropy, which operate to pull the component pieces of
pluralist nations apart, and political gravity, which pull them together
in pursuit of common goals. It considers both the successes and limits
of the American model, identifying those aspects that are instructive
for governance elsewhere and those that may be inapplicable abroad.
Finally, it reflects on the way that federalism can act as a doubleedged sword—or perhaps more accurately, a simultaneous sword and
shield—providing a potential conduit for claims to secession at the
same time that it functions as a safety valve to defuse the same
impulses.
Beginning with a historical account of secession in the United
States, Part I reviews American secession movements at both the
subnational and national level, with special focus on the paradigmatic
9

See, e.g., 2 THE WAYS OF FEDERALISM IN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE HORIZONS
TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY IN SPAIN (Alberto López Basaguren & Leire Escajedo San
Epifanio eds., 2013) (international compendium of secession scholarship).
OF
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cases of the American Revolution and the American Civil War. Both
examples demonstrate the deep regional tensions that can surface
within a larger overall polity, reflecting the challenges of pluralist
societies more generally. The southern states’ failed attempt to secede
during the Civil War led to the formal disavowal of secession in the
United States—leaving us to grapple with the meaning of what had
already happened during the Revolutionary War, when the American
colonies unilaterally separated from Great Britain.
After considering the meaning of these wrenching moments in
American history, Part II turns to our preferred means of mediating
regional conflict, the institution of constitutional federalism. By
dividing sovereign authority between local and national levels of
government, federalism creates multiple simultaneous forums for
political contest, competition, and collaboration that have diffused
regional tension through engaged multilevel governance. Like all
systems of federalism, the U.S. model cultivates the “sweet spot”
between competing claims for local autonomy and national
interdependence, allocating sovereign authority among levels of
government where each best advances the overall goal. The
availability of nested political sites for regional expression,
interjurisdictional innovation, and negotiated governance have many
benefits, including fortification of the American Union against the
kinds of conflicts that might otherwise lead toward fragmentation.
Part III acknowledges the aspirations and the limitations of the
American model, and perhaps all federal systems, in coping with
regional tension. Federalism offers useful tools for navigating the
political forces of entropy and gravity that operate in all pluralist
societies, but of course, it cannot solve all problems. This Part reflects
on the challenges facing all federal unions, as well as the differences
between the American model and alternatives that may better suit
unions confronting more substantial regional diversity or entrenched
regional conflict. The Article concludes with brief reflections about
when secession is more and less justified, based on the relative
strength of competing claims for autonomy and interdependence.
I
SECESSION IN THE UNITED STATES
In the political context, “secession” refers to the circumstances by
which a new sovereign territory is carved out of an existing sovereign
territory, so that each continues thereafter as a separate political
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entity.10 This meaning of the word did not take hold until well into
the nineteenth century, after several such circumstances had arisen,11
and it does not appear widely in the literature until the twentieth
century. But with regard to that meaning, the U.S. model of secession
initially appears straightforward. Consistent with the dominant stance
on secession in international law,12 the formal American model can
be summarized as: “no secession.”13 The U.S. Constitution includes
no right of secession, the Supreme Court has conclusively disavowed
it, and the United States has never recognized claims for secession
from the overall Union as legitimate.14 Today, most Americans will
live out their lives without ever seriously considering the possibility
that the nation might cleave into parts.15
Nevertheless, a scratch below the surface reveals that secession and
the debates that surrounds it have played a vibrant role in American
political culture throughout much of the nation’s history. It has done
so at both the national level, where secession conflicts have been most
conspicuous, and at the subnational level, where proposals for
secession continue to this day. This section briefly reviews the
American experience of subnational secession before taking on the
weightier matters of national-level secession.

10 See David Armitage, Secession and Civil War, in SECESSION AS AN INTERNATIONAL
PHENOMENON 37–54 (Don H. Doyle ed., 2010); ALEKSANDAR PAVKOVIĆ & PETER
RADAN, CREATING NEW STATES: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SECESSION 5 (2007)
(“Secession is the creation of a new state by the withdrawal of a territory and its
population where that territory was previously part of an existing state”); Donald W.
Livingston, The Very Idea of Secession, 35 SOC’Y 38, 45 (1998) (“Secession, however, is
not revolution because it does not attempt to gain control of the government of a unitary
state; rather it attempts to limit the jurisdiction of that government over the territory it
occupies.”). But see Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial
Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 177 (1991) (discussing the difficulty in establishing a
working definition of “secession” for U.N. purposes).
11 See Livingston, supra note 10, at 38.
12 See generally In re Secession of Québec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 222 (Can.) (discussed
supra note 3).
13 See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868) (holding that the union of states created
by the American constitution is indestructible).
14 Id.
15 That said, the idea continues to surface. See, e.g., CALEXIT BLUE BOOK, supra note
8; infra notes 34–37 and accompanying text (discussing the Alaskan independence
movement.
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A. Subnational Secession: Then and Now
The Constitution may deny it at the national level, but secession
has played a formative role in U.S. history at the subnational level.
Prominent American states have subdivided into two, and municipal
governments below the state level continue to divide and reconstitute
as their citizens’ interests in autonomy and interdependence evolve.
While most of the secession discourse presumes it as an exclusive
feature of national level governance (regarding the creation of new
nation states), the conversation about American secession rightly
includes the subnational level, given the unique status of the
American states within the U.S. system of constitutional federalism.
Under the U.S. model of dual sovereignty, the fifty states possess
their own sovereign authority to govern in realms of law that have not
been enumerated to the national government.16 The source of state
sovereign authority—the common law police power to regulate for
the public welfare—exists separately from the authority conferred on
the national government by the American Constitution, and it cannot
be fully displaced by that national authority.17 Each state is thus a
sovereign entity in ways that render them distinct from the regional
subdivisions of a nonfederal nation. For that reason, when an
American state splits in two, that process shares certain features with
national-level secession, creating a new sovereign territory with
powers distinct from both the original state and the central
government.
Indeed, states have subdivided on several notable occasions over
American history, for reasons ranging from administrative concerns
to avulsive political conflict. For example, North and South Carolina
separated peacefully in 1712 due to the slow separation of interests
over time, as their economic concerns grew increasingly
differentiated.18 The Carolinas subdivided while still colonies of
Britain, distinguishing their separation from true subnational
secession within a federal system, but the new American states
continued to subdivide as boundaries were solidified and new
territories acquired. For example, several of the original American
colonies had been granted territory extending from the Atlantic Ocean
16 See, e.g., ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 7–8 (2012)
[hereinafter RYAN, TUG OF WAR].
17 Id. at 8–10.
18 Creating the Carolinas, U.S. HISTORY (2016), http://www.ushistory.org/us/5c.asp
(last visited Jan. 28, 2016).
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to an undefined point westward—“from sea to sea”—and new states
were created as boundaries were settled and the western territories
became new states.19
More dramatic movements for state-level secession took place on
the eve of the American Civil War of the 1860s. Citizens in the
mountainous regions of Tennessee and Virginia advocated for
separation due to deep political discord over the positions taken by
their states about slavery and national-level secession.20 In 1861,
shortly after the state of Virginia joined the Confederate States in
their effort to secede from the rest of the United States, the
westernmost portion of the state succeeded in breaking off to form
West Virginia.21 Notably, West Virginia became the only state to
secede from the Confederacy in order to rejoin the United States, and
it was admitted back into the Union as an independent state in 1863.22
Subnational secession has also taken place for more prosaic
administrative reasons, as in the case of the 1889 separation of North
and South Dakota. The Dakotas split on the eve of statehood in order
to break the oversized territory into smaller units, on the theory that
smaller administrative chunks would be more amenable to good
governance within the federal system.23 Nationwide, municipalities
below the state level continue to form, dissolve, and separate for
reasons of good public administration.24 However, new intrastate
subdivisions remain subordinate to the full sovereign authority of the
state, with much less regulatory independence than the states vis a vis

19 See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 49–52 (1968)
(describing subdivision of the original western territories of Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New York, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia).
20 SCOTT REYNOLDS NELSON & CAROL SHERIFF, A PEOPLE AT WAR: CIVILIANS AND
SOLDIERS IN AMERICA’S CIVIL WAR, 1854-1857 55 (2007) (“By the middle of 1861, in
both Tennessee and Virginia, mountain politicians planned a secession of their own and
sought to create two independent states: East Tennessee and West Virginia. The Virginia
movement succeeded, partly because of support from the federal army. The newly formed
United States Army of the Ohio, officered by Major General George McClellan, crossed
the Ohio River into Virginia in May 1861.”).
21 Id.
22 West Virginia Statehood, W. VA. ARCHIVES & HIST. (2015), http://www.wvculture
.org/history/archives/statehoo.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2017).
23 See generally North Dakota and South Dakota Were Admitted to the Union
November 2, 1889, AM’S STORY FROM AM’S LIBR., http://www.americaslibrary.gov/jb
/gilded/jb_gilded_dakotas_1.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2017).
24 See, e.g., Formation of Local Governments, FLA. STAT. § 165 (2005) (Florida statute
governing the formation, dissolution, incorporation, and merger of municipalities).
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the federal government (and for that reason, intrastate separation has
less significance for the larger secession discourse).
Since the separation of the Dakotas, the era of state-level secession
in the United States has slowed down considerably, and as a practical
matter, has probably ended. Nevertheless, the idea of subnational
secession is still periodically raised in various U.S. political contexts.
For example, there have been news-making proposals to break the
state of California into “the Californias.”25 With some thirty million
residents, California is the most heavily populated of all U.S. states,
and its economy, if separated from the rest of the American economy,
would be the sixth largest in the world.26 Proposals have ranged from
dividing California into two, four, or even six separate states—usually
to advance different regional interests in different parts of the large
state.27 Some proposals to divide the state may also be designed to
limit the jurisdiction of the influential Ninth Circuit Federal Court of
Appeals, which is heavily influenced by litigation in southern
California but binds judicial policy in many other western states.28
Proposals to split California have been made as recently as 2011, but
they have never gained much political traction, and success in the
foreseeable future seems very unlikely.29
The likelihood of national-level secession in the United States
seems even lower, and yet even that idea is occasionally raised in the
political sphere. For example, voices within the state of Texas semi25 Jennifer Chaussee, Billionaire’s Breakup Plan Would Chop California into Six
States, REUTERS (July 14, 2014, 6:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cali
fornia-breakup-idUSKBN0FK03P20140715.
26 California Passes France As World’s 6th-Largest Economy, FORTUNE (June 17,
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/17/california-france-6th-largest-economy/.
27 See Chaussee, supra note 25.
28 See generally Eric J. Gribbin, California Split: A Plan to Divide the Ninth Circuit, 47
DUKE L.J. 351 (1997) (stating that the connection between breaking up California in order
to break up the Ninth Circuit hinges on the large volume of litigation generated in southern
California in comparison with the rest of the circuit, combined with the desire to limit the
precedential effect elsewhere of California-based Ninth Circuit decisions. The Ninth
Circuit carries a very heavy load in comparison to other Circuits, but proposals to divide
the Circuit by removing California have been unpersuasive, in part because southern
California has historically generated more litigation than the rest of the Circuit combined.
Creating a Thirteenth Circuit including only California would create a lopsided result, with
an ongoing overload in the new Thirteenth Circuit and an unduly light load in the
remaining Ninth Circuit. However, breaking California into pieces would enable the
creation of a Thirteenth Circuit that includes only southern California, creating a more
balanced judicial load while limiting the influence of those decisions elsewhere.).
29 Daniel B. Wood, 51st State? Small Step Forward for Long-Shot ‘South California’
Plan, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 12, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/51st-state-small
-step-forward-long-shot-south-233234624.html.
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regularly threaten to secede from the rest of the nation, often on the
eve of a presidential or gubernatorial election.30 According to the
usual script, a Texan public figure opines that Texas should secede
from the Union if the federal government declines to adopt his or her
policy preferences31—and the rest of the nation then performs its
nonplussed response, generally with tongue-in-cheek applause,
wishing Texas well on its way out.32 But apart from a few fireworks
in the news cycle and on late-night comedy, nothing ever actually
happens; it is mostly empty political theater, and everyone seems to
know it.33 The theatrical public responses to Texan secession banter
underscore the sense that, for all practical purposes, secession no
longer seems like a viable option in U.S. political culture.
In the early 2000s, however, a small but sincere secession
movement arose in Alaska, where the Alaskan Independence Party
secured one hundred signatures in support of a ballot referendum
proposing Alaskan secession from the United States.34 The Alaska
Independence Party seeks to establish Alaska as an independent
nation, according to libertarian principles of limited governance,
privatization, tax abolition, home schooling, and gun rights.35 The
ballot initiative was rejected by the elections authority and ultimately
the courts, on grounds that a ballot initiative cannot be certified for
extraconstitutional purposes.36 As the Supreme Court of Alaska

30 ‘Texas Secession’ Resolution to be Placed Before Texas GOP, NEWS RADIO 1200
WOAI (Nov. 12, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.woai.com/articles/woai-local-news-spon
sored-by-five-119078/texas-secession-resolution-to-be-placed-14117190/.
31 See Alexander Mooney, Texas Governor Says Secession Possible, CNN (Apr. 16,
2009, 11:56 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/04/16/texas-governor-says
-secession-possible/ (discussing statements by Texas Governor Rick Perry declining to
rule out the possibility that Texas may one day secede from the union).
32 See, e.g., Shadee Ashtari, 10 Things We’d Lose if Texas Actually Seceded, HUFFPOST
(Nov. 5, 2013, 6:05 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/05/texas-secede_n_421
3506.html (suggesting, in jest, that America might be better off if Texas followed through
on its threats to secede).
33 See Peter Weber, What Would Happen if Texas Actually Seceded?, THE WEEK (Nov.
26,
2012),
http://theweek.com/articles/470115/what-happen-texas-actually-seceded
(observing that secession talk is usually for the purpose of registering political
disappointment, rather than to signal a genuine attempt at withdrawal).
34 Kohlhaas v. State, 223 P.3d 105 (Alaska 2010).
35 Alaskan Independence Party Platform, ALASKAN INDEP. PARTY, http://www.akip
.org/platform.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2016).
36 Kohlhaas, 223 P.3d at 111–13.
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ultimately concluded in 2010, “secession from the Union is clearly
unconstitutional.”37
The unambiguous response to the Alaska initiative reinforces that
the formal U.S. model of national-level secession remains: “no
secession.” Here in the United States, goes the political wisdom, we
simply don’t do secession—never will, never have.
Or have we?
B. The American Revolution
Notwithstanding the unambiguous judicial message on nationallevel secession, it may be that national secession actually has played
an important role in American history—at the very beginning of the
story, when the original thirteen colonies separated from the rest of
the United Kingdom. The American Declaration of Independence of
1776, claiming the right of the American colonies to separate from the
rest of Britain as fully sovereign territories,38 has been recognized as
“the first formal secession proclamation in world history.”39 In the
Revolutionary War that followed, the colonies succeeded in
establishing political independence, ultimately joining with one
another to form the United States.
Of course, most Americans think of these events not as secession,
but as revolution (as the name suggests). And indeed, the American
Revolution spawned a set of ideas that were revolutionary in every
sense of the word: the written Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the
institution of federalism itself—all were paradigm-shifting
innovations in governance that have forever altered the path of the
American experience, and arguably, that of the world.40

37

Id. at 113.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 6 (U.S. 1776).
39 Cf. Armitage, supra note 10, at 48.
40 Cf. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992)
(arguing that nevertheless, the interpretation of this historical period remains a subject of
intense interest and contestation by historians, who have continued to debate the
ideological roots of the American Revolution in the European Enlightenment, the
remnants of feudal aristocracy in the early American experiment, and other interesting
possibilities that go beyond the scope of this treatment). See, e.g., Bernard Bailyn,
Political Experience and Enlightenment Ideas in Eighteenth-Century America, 67 AM.
HIST. REV. 339, 341 & n.1 (1962) (listing other scholarly literature interpreting, disputing,
and reinterpreting the intellectual history and ideological progeny of the American
Revolution); Thomas C. Barrow, The American Revolution as a Colonial War for
Independence, 25 WM. & MARY Q. 452 (1968) (grappling with the question of “just ‘how
revolutionary’” was the American Revolution); ROBERT R. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE
38
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Yet if we define “revolution” in existential terms as the full
rejection of the pre-existing order,41 the answer to the question of
what happened in 1776 is less clear. After all, if we set aside the
ravages of the war itself and compare ordinary life in the times
immediately before and after the Revolution, very little changed in
most people’s day-to-day lives. The sovereign changed, but not much
else. The relative continuity of the American experience is especially
profound in comparison to other nations that have experienced truer
revolutions—such as the Chinese Revolution in 1949, or the French
Revolution in 1789—in which virtually all aspects of the pre-existing
order really did change.42
In this regard, comparing the American Revolution in 1776 and the
nearly contemporaneous French Revolution in 1789 is informative.
The American Revolution rejected British sovereignty, but it
preserved a surprising degree of the rest of the existing order. The
colonists rejected the British monarchy, but they preserved British
common law and the common law system, which remains at the core
of American law today.43 For the most part, they held on to the
British system of property rights, and they protected those private
property rights that had been previously recognized by the former
British Crown (which had given very limited credence to the rights of
indigenous inhabitants).44 The religious order, to the extent there was
DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE AND AMERICA, 17601800 I (1959) (relating the American Revolution to European predecessors).
41 See “Revolution,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/revolution (last visited Oct. 14, 2017) (defining revolution as “2a: a sudden
radical or complete change b: a fundamental change in political organization . . . c: activity
or movement designed to effect fundamental changes in the socioeconomic situation d: a
fundamental change in the way of thinking about or visualizing something: a change of
paradigm”).
42 See generally FRANK DIKÖTTER, THE TRAGEDY OF LIBERATION: A HISTORY OF THE
CHINESE REVOLUTION 1945-1957 (2013); CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, THE DAYS OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION (William Morrow & Company, Inc. 1980).
43 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 32
(2002) (“The colonies won independence after a long war; but unlike say the French or the
Russian revolutions, there was no sharp legal break with the past. The common law
system (American style) remained intact. Indeed, in some sense, the aim of the Revolution
was continuity, not overthrow: continuity of the colonial traditions, laws, and ways of
life.”).
44 See, e.g., Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (affirming American accession to
British sovereign property, under the original principles of British law, and highlighting
the unfortunate results for indigenous inhabitants). See generally JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER
ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES POLICIES, AND PRACTICES (6th ed. 2014) (identifying the
roots of various American common law doctrines in British common law).
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one, was unchanged before and after the revolution, and pre-existing
social relationships were largely maintained.45
By contrast, the French Revolution changed nearly everything
about the status quo.46 Like the American Revolution, the French
Revolution advanced new ideologies of liberalism, secularism, and
human rights that would forever change the world.47 But in addition
to these revolutionary ideas, the French experienced revolution in
virtually every aspect of public life. Not only was the monarch
removed from power, the entire political and social order was
transformed. Feudalism was abolished, and the property and
privileges of the nobility were attacked.48 The religious hierarchy was
overthrown, and political power was massively shifted from the
Church to the secular state.49 Women marched on Versailles to
protest widespread poverty.50 Laws were rewritten, debt was
forgiven, and divorce legalized.51 Even the Roman calendar was
rejected after the French Revolution, in favor of a new calendar
beginning at the year zero, to honor the nation’s new start.52
Perhaps most powerfully illustrating the point, after the French
Revolution, King Louis XVI was beheaded.53 After the American

45

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 32.
See generally 2 THOMAS CARLYLE, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: A HISTORY (1867).
47 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A BRIEF DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
7–12 (Lynn Hunt ed. & trans., Bedford Books of St. Martin’s Press 1996).
48 JOHN HALL STEWART, A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
107 (The MacMillan Company 1961).
49 PETER MCPHEE, FRENCH REVOLUTION 1789–1799 199 (2002) (noting that “[t]he
Revolution had created a secular state; although the Restoration was to pronounce
Catholicism the state religion, an important legacy of the Revolution was the creation of an
ethos among public functionaries that their primary allegiance was to the ideal of a secular
state which transcended particular interests. Never again could the Catholic Church claim
pre-revolutionary levels of obedience or acceptance among the people.”).
50 ALBERT SOBOUL, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 1787–1799: FROM THE STORMING OF
THE BASTILLE TO NAPOLEON 156 (Alan Forrest & Colin Jones trans., Random House
1974).
51 WILLIAM DOYLE, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 121 (3d ed.
1990).
52 MATTHEW SHAW, TIME AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: THE REPUBLICAN
CALENDAR, 1789–YEAR XIV 1 (2011) (“Together with reshaping the political world, the
Revolutionaries endeavored to define the republican age with a new system of days,
months and years, commemorating the nation’s achievements and laying the groundwork
for a new future, free from the delusions of the past.”).
53 HILAIRE BELLOC, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 124 (1911).
46
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Revolution, King George III of England continued to reign over the
British Empire—just not the American colonies.54
Thus, if we understand revolution as a full rejection of the existing
order, and not just a political parting of the ways—then the American
Revolution seems a surprisingly weak candidate. But if the American
Revolution wasn’t a real revolution, what else could it have been?
One answer, although lawyers and legal academics rarely talk about it
this way, is that we might understand the American Revolution as
something more akin to secession.
Little in the legal discourse supports this view—no doubt because
the courts have so flatly denied the possibility—but political theorists
and historians have long debated whether the means by which the
American colonies accomplished their independence should be
viewed more as secession or revolution. The discourse has roots in the
period of the Revolution itself, evident in the contrasting reflections
of contemporaneous commentators like Thomas Paine,55 Edmund
Burke,56 and Thomas Jefferson.57 These figures fell along a spectrum
between extremes, in which Paine saw himself as fomenting
revolution,58 Burke defended the American Revolution as sensibly
constrained in contrast to full-out Revolution,59 and Thomas Jefferson
moved over time from advocating reform from within the British
Empire toward genuine revolutionary zeal.60 Debate over how best to
characterize what happened then continues just as fervently into
modern times.61
54 George III (r. 1760–1820), THE ROYAL FAMILY, https://www.royal.uk/george-iii-r
-1760-1820 (last visited Oct. 14, 2017).
55 See THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776) (championing the idea of full American
independence from Britain).
56 See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION OF FRANCE (J.C.D. Clark
ed., Stanford Univ. Press, 2001).
57 See generally DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON (1994).
58 PAINE, supra note 55, at 68 (“The laying a country desolate with fire and sword,
declaring war against the natural rights of all mankind, and extirpating the defenders
thereof from the face of the earth, is the concern of every man to whom nature hath given
the power of feeling . . . .”).
59 See BURKE, supra note 56 (contrasting the worthiness of the restrained campaign for
American independence from Britain with the disastrous chaos of the French Revolution).
60 MAYER, supra note 57, at 25–30 (reviewing the transformation of Jefferson’s ideas
from support for “British America” to support for American independence).
61 See generally Daniel McCarthy, Was the American Revolution Secessionist?, AM.
CONSERVATIVE (Oct. 5, 2014, 5:03 PM), http://www.theamericanconservative.com
/mccarthy/was-the-american-revolution-secessionist/. Cf. Brooks D. Simpson, The
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Today, many scholars hold fast to the idea that the American
Revolution was not just revolutionary,62 but radical.63 For example,
historian Gordon Wood characterizes the Revolution as one “as
radical and social as any revolution in history” because, in destroying
the monarchy, the colonists set in motion a change that would
fundamentally redefine society—albeit in a process that would take
decades to fully unfold.64 By the early nineteenth century, however,
he argues that “American society had been radically and thoroughly
transformed,” noting such examples as the destruction of the
aristocracy and the advancing position of women.65 “One class did
not overthrow another; the poor did not supplant the rich[,]” he notes,
“[b]ut social relationships—the way people were connected to
another—were changed, and decisively so.”66 Framing the Revolution
in these dramatic but favorable terms is consistent with the cultural
origin story that most Americans hold dear.
Others, including conservative icon Russel Kirk and his followers,
prefer to cast the American Revolution in much more moderate terms,
contrasting the worthy American movement with (what they
considered) the undesirable chaos of revolutionary France.67 Drawing
on the reflections of Edmund Burke, Kirk specifically characterizes
what happened in 1776 as “a revolution not made but prevented.”68
Conservative philosopher Donald Livingston similarly defends the
Revolution as a “secession,”69 in direct contrast to the comparatively
distasteful concept of revolution:
Secession is often confused with revolution and civil war. The latter
two presuppose the modern unitary state. Lockean revolution is an
attempt to overthrow the government of a unitary state that has
American Revolution . . . Not the American Secession, CROSSROADS (Oct. 11, 2012),
https://cwcrossroads.wordpress.com/2012/10/11/the-american-revolution-not-the-american
-secession/.
62 See, e.g., CRANE BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION (1952).
63 See generally WOOD, supra note 40.
64 Id. at 5.
65 Id. at 6, 8.
66 Id. at 6.
67 RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTION (1990) [hereinafter KIRK,
CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTION] (explaining why the American Revolution should not be
seen as a revolution according to the modern meaning of the word); RUSSELL KIRK,
PROSPECTS FOR CONSERVATIVES 28–39 (1956) [hereinafter KIRK, PROSPECTS FOR
CONSERVATIVES] (discussing the American Revolution as a conservative endeavor).
68 KIRK, CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTION, supra note 67, at 19 (grounding his analysis
in the contemporaneous account of Edmund Burke).
69 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 10, at 40–42.
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violated its trust. Secession, however, is not revolution because it
does not attempt to gain control of the government of a unitary
state; rather it attempts to limit the jurisdiction of that government
over the territory it occupies. This is a serious matter, but it is not
revolution. Its name is “secession.” And the sort of arguments that
would justify secession are categorically distinct from the
arguments that would justify revolution.70

It may be that characterizing the American Revolution as a
secession appeals to conservative thinkers of subsequent times71
because that better aligns this iconic moment of American history
with the principles of conservative political theory. Broadly speaking,
conservative theorists prefer the maintenance of order to abrupt and
destabilizing changes.72 For them, framing the American Revolution
as a secession enables a much more favorable view of the
protagonists of the Revolution, George Washington and his
contemporaries. For example, Russel Kirk has argued at length that
the American Revolution was a conservative endeavor to protect the
rights of English subjects, and that the “founding fathers” embodied
the essence of conservativism.73 Perhaps characterizing the founding
fathers of the nation as noble, conservative heroes who changed the
minimum possible to achieve the necessary goal of independence is
more appealing than associating them with a more revolutionary
framework, in which they might be viewed as less honorable freedom
-fighting terrorists.
Still others recognize the possibility that the Revolution resists
categorization because it was more than one thing at a time. For
example, Professor David Armitage considers the possibilities for
70

Id. at 45.
Of course, the most conservative thinkers at the time of the actual Revolution were
probably the Tories—English loyalists who returned to England or fled to Canada—who
took a decidedly different view of the Revolution. See, e.g., THOMAS B. ALLEN, TORIES:
FIGHTING FOR THE KING IN AMERICA’S FIRST CIVIL WAR (2010).
72 Cf. KIRK, PROSPECTS FOR CONSERVATIVES, supra note 67, at 38–39 (defining
conservatism to include a preference for order and deep respect for the past, and “[a]
prejudice against sudden change, a feeling that it is unwise to break radically with political
prescription, an inclination to tolerate what abuses may exist in present institutions out of a
practical acquaintance with the violent and unpredictable nature of doctrinaire reform.”);
see also William F. Buckley Jr., Our Mission Statement, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 19, 1955, 8:00
AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/223549/our-mission-statement-william-f
-buckley-jr (noting that the journal of conservative thought “stands athwart history, yelling
Stop, at a time when no one is inclined to do so, or to have much patience with those who
so urge it”).
73 See KIRK, PROSPECTS FOR CONSERVATIVES, supra note 67, at 28–39 (discussing the
American Revolution at length).
71
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characterizing the American Revolution as a rebellion, a secession,
and a civil war—concluding that it was both a civil war and a
secession, with the Declaration of Independence as its pivotal act.74
We ordinarily understand secession to involve one polity breaking off
from another, with no requirement for a change in the form of
governance, whereas a revolution implies a dramatic change in
governance but says nothing about breaking off. By this logic, France
could only have experienced a revolution, while the United States
might have experienced both.
And yet still others see the American Revolution as a species
within the larger genus of anticolonial political movements, with
independent justification that effectively distinguishes them from all
other categories.75 To this end, Thomas Barrow argues that “colonial
wars for independence or ‘liberation’ are generally different from
revolutions of the French or Russian variety,” with an “inner logic of
their own,” concluding that “after all, the American Revolution was
just that—a colonial war for liberation.”76
In fact, many political theorists resist the characterization of the
American Revolution as a secession for exactly this reason. For them,
a critical component of the analysis is the overarching political
context in which the early American conflict unfolded: that of
European imperialism.77 These scholars view secession as something
like a political divorce—a separation that happens between parties of
relatively equal political standing. But the power dynamics in
imperial relationships are different from those between competing
parts of a single polity, such as those between the joined territories
that would later divide into Norway and Sweden, or Slovakia and the
Czech Republic. By this view, the wresting of independence by a
colony from an imperial power is an inherently revolutionary act.78
74

Armitage, supra note 10, at 47.
See, e.g., Barrow, supra note 40, at 454 (arguing that the American Revolution was a
colonial war for liberation, and noting that “[c]olonial wars for independence have an
inner logic of their own”); see also LOUIS HARTZ, THE FOUNDING OF NEW SOCIETIES:
STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, LATIN AMERICA, SOUTH AFRICA,
CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA (1969) (analyzing the American Revolution through his
theoretical inquiry into the process of postcolonial development and in terms of
“fragmentation” from European traditions).
76 Barrow, supra note 40, at 454.
77 See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 61.
78 See, e.g., Bernard Bailyn, Political Experience and Enlightenment Ideas in
Eighteenth-Century America, 67 AM. HIST. REV. 339 (1962); cf. PAULINE MAIER, FROM
RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION: COLONIAL RADICALS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO BRITAIN, 1765–1776 (1991).
75
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When a colony throws off the yoke of dominant imperial power, goes
this wisdom, it is making revolution. Accordingly, framing the
American Revolution as a secession elides the political dynamics
underlying the significance of the change.79
Some who reject the secession theory of the American Revolution
are also suspicious of its strategic use by those hoping to justify the
attempt at secession to which we turn next—that by the southern
states over national conflicts involving the institution of slavery. The
concern is that characterizing the favorably-viewed American
Revolution as a secession from Britain confers legitimacy on the later
attempt by the Confederate states to secede from the Union80—an
attempt that, by most contemporary perspectives, wants for
legitimacy.81
In the end, of course, much of this debate is over semantics:
everything in it hinges on how we define “secession” and
“revolution,” and work like Armitage’s reminds us that it is entirely
possible to understand the American origin story as an example of
both. Perhaps the Declaration of Independence was a secessionist act,
creating an American independence in theory that was ultimately
consummated by revolution. Today, the debate is rhetorical at most,
but ironic nonetheless—in that a nation that has so clearly concluded
that secession is constitutionally unavailable may have, itself, been
conceived in secession. In the end, perhaps all we can do is consider
whether the anticolonial movement that resulted in what we call the
“American Revolution” also had an underappreciated secessionist
element.
Either way, it is interesting to note the strong emotional valance
that seems to attend the vocabulary we use to describe our national
origins. For some Americans, on both sides of the issue, whether this
aspect of American history is framed as a secession or a revolution
appears to make an identity-implicating difference. (And this almost
certainly tells us more about ourselves than it tells us about anything
in the historical record.)
79

See Barrow, supra note 40, at 454.
See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 10, at 45 (characterizing the American Civil War
not as a civil war but as an act of secession, and comparing it in kind to the American
Revolution).
81 See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 61 (critiquing efforts to legitimize the Civil War, or
other modern attempts at secession, by characterizing the American Revolution as a
secession).
80
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C. The American Civil War
We now turn to the more obvious, and perhaps the more important
moment in American history that implicates secession: the American
Civil War.82 In the early 1860s, the southern states attempted to
withdraw from the United States to form a separate nation, resulting
in the bloodiest war ever fought on U.S. territory.83 The Civil War
represents the fulmination of a conflict between northern and southern
states that had been brewing since the beginning of the nation’s
history over the institution of slavery. The southern states had
developed agricultural economies that hinged on forced labor by
slaves imported from Africa and their progeny, born domestically and
held in captivity.84 Most northern states did not use slave labor, and
many northerners had urged the end of slavery since the
Revolutionary era.85
While the northern and southern states were united in their effort to
achieve independence from Britain, they remained divided over the
role of slavery in the new United States. The dispute could not be
reconciled at the Constitutional Conventions, and evidence of the
ongoing conflict mars the original American Constitution.86 Mixed
messages about the legitimacy of slavery can be found in various
parts of the early text. The Preamble promises the blessings of justice
and liberty for all,87 but these promises were clearly not intended for
82 For a modern intellectual history of the Confederate secession movement, see Alison
L. LaCroix, Continuity in Secession: The Case of the Confederate Constitution (U. Chi.,
Working Paper No. 512, 2015); see also Armitage, supra note 10, at 46 (noting that the
American Civil War may have been more of a rebellion than a civil war, because the
Confederacy sought sovereignty only over its own territory, and not the nation as a whole).
83 See generally THE U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY, THE WEST POINT HISTORY OF THE
CIVIL WAR 28–29 (Clifford J. Rogers et al. eds., 2014).
84 See, e.g., Drew Gilpin Faust, The Rhetoric and Ritual of Agriculture in Antebellum
South Carolina, 45 J.S. HIST. 541, 544–58 (1979) (“By the early nineteenth century the
South had thoroughly committed itself to an economic, social, and racial order based on
profitable staple-crop agriculture carried out by a labor force of black slaves.”); Peter
Kolchin, Reevaluating the Antebellum Slave Community: A Comparative Perspective, 70
J. AM. HIST. 579, 587 (1983) (discussing the shifting American slave population from
imported persons to those born into captivity).
85 See, e.g., William G. Shade, Antislavery, in 1 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY
208 (Stanley I. Kutler ed., 3d ed. 2003).
86 See infra notes 87−91 and accompanying text.
87 See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
of America.”).
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those held in bondage (nor, until much later, for women, indigenous
people, and others).88 Slavery was not expressly permitted by the
original Constitution, but neither was it prohibited—and the
institution of slavery was implicitly legitimized by a number of
clauses acknowledging it as a constituent part of American society.
For example, the original Constitution included the now notorious
“Three-Fifths Clause,” which clarified that slaves would be counted
as three-fifths the value of free persons (excluding Indians) for the
purpose of legislative districting.89 The Constitution allowed
Congress to ban the slave trade after 1808, reflecting the preferences
of the northern states.90 But reflecting the preferences of the southern
states, the same clause expressly allowed the slave trade at least until
then, and it implicitly allowed the continued use of domestically born
slaves thereafter. The early Constitution also mandated the return of
fugitive slaves to their owners,91 a point that would particularly
inflame relations between northern abolitionists and southern
slaveholders in the coming years.
Unresolved tensions over slavery simmered for almost a century
until they finally boiled over on the eve of the Civil War. Regional
conflict intensified as the United States extended westward, and the
north and south clashed over whether the practice of slavery would be
permitted in new states.92 After heated debate in Congress, a
legislative compromise was enacted in 1820—the Missouri
Compromise—that would allow slavery to continue in the south, but

88 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII–XV. Nonwhites did not gain equal liberties with
whites until the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, ratified
in 1865, 1868, and 1870, respectively. See id. Women were granted voting rights by the
Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
89 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers, which shall be
determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other
Persons.”) (emphasis added).
90 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any
of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight . . . .”).
91 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (“No Person held to Service or Labour in one State,
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up
on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.”).
92 E.g., SUSAN DIXON, THE TRUE HISTORY OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE AND ITS
REPEAL (1898).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2775377

RYAN (DO NOT DELETE)

144

12/14/2017 8:09 PM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96, 123

prohibit its expansion into new American states north of Texas.93
However, a subsequent law passed in 1854 allowed slavery in any
state that approved it by popular vote, sparking outrage among
abolitionists.94 Fugitive Slave Acts were enacted to criminalize
assistance given to slaves escaping into free states, further enraging
abolitionists.95 In frustration over these and other conflicts, southern
states experimented with acts of nullification—declaring that they
would no longer consider themselves bound under the Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause to federal laws with which they disagreed.96
In 1860 and 1861, the southern states finally decided to withdraw
from the United States to form a separate union, the Confederate
States of America.97 Territorial referenda were taken in Texas,
Tennessee, Virginia, and Arkansas, each declaring victory for
secession. The balloting in each state suffered from problems of fraud
and intimidation that call into question the legitimacy of their
results,98 but they still may have reflected a majority view among the
voting population.
93 Missouri Compromise, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545, 548 (1820); see also DIXON, supra note
92, at 54.
94 Kansas-Nebraska Act, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277, 289 (1854). The 1854 Kansas-Nebraska
Act admitted Kansas and Nebraska as slave-states notwithstanding the Missouri
Compromise, invalidating the earlier law and allowing new states to become slave-holding
by popular vote. Id.
95 See, e.g., Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850) (“An Act To amend, and
supplementary to, the Act entitled An Act respecting Fugitives from Justice, and Persons
escaping from the service of their Masters, approved February twelfth, one thousand seven
hundred and ninety-three.”).
96 See, e.g., South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification, November 24, 1832, YALE L.
SCH., http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ordnull.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2017)
(declaring that certain laws imposing duties on the importation of foreign commodities
were constitutionally unauthorized and therefore “null, void, and no law, nor binding upon
this State”). Non-slavery related justifications for southern secession (like these) have also
been posed, including southern resentment over the 1861 Morrill Tariff, which conferred
special protections for infant industries in the North. See id. Tariffs provoking southern ire
did lead to the nullification crisis of the 1830s, but they are not among the grievances
listed in the Confederate States’ declarations of secession, which center squarely on
slavery. See id. Some scholars suggest that the tariff grievance has been used
opportunistically as a post hoc justification for secession, emphasizing that it is not
supported by historical evidence. See, e.g., MARC-WILLIAM PALEN, Debunking the Civil
War Tariff Myth, IMPERIAL & GLOBAL FORUM (Mar. 2, 2015), http://imperialglobalexeter
.com/2015/03/02/debunking-the-civil-war-tariff-myth/.
97 THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, supra note 83, at 28–29.
98 See, e.g., Walter L. Buenger, Secession, TEX. ST. HIST. ASS’N (June 15, 2010),
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mgs02 (describing the political and
military buildup to the Texas referendum and observing that “[t]he seizure of the San
Antonio arsenal, the evacuation of federal troops, and the sending of delegates to
Montgomery made the secession referendum appear an insignificant afterthought”).
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The Texas case is illustrative. In January 1861, sixty-one
representatives from the Texas state legislature convened a state
convention on secession, acting without clear legal authority.99 Some
parts of the state sent elected delegates to the convention, while other
parts of the state did not.100 The delegate elections suffered from
serious procedural problems that cast doubt on their fairness, even by
nineteenth century standards.101 Many were elected by voice vote at
public meetings that unionists were discouraged from attending, or
that were ignored by unionists who considered them illegal, so the
resulting delegate pool overwhelmingly favored secession.102
Afterward, the legislature passed an act ratifying these elections,
attempting to provide posthoc legal authority for the convention that
had been lacking at the outset.103
On February 1, 1861, the convention adopted an ordinance of
secession that would be put to a popular vote on February 23,
1861.104 But even before the popular vote was held, Texas sent
delegates to participate in the formation of the Confederate States of
America.105 Meanwhile, the convention also empowered a newly
formed Committee on Public Safety to seize all federal property in
Texas, including the federal arsenal, and ordered the evacuation of
three thousand federal troops in Texas.106 The ordinance of secession
ultimately passed by a wide margin in the popular vote,107 but there
was also evidence that voters with unionist sentiments were actively

99

Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 704 (1868).
Id.
101 Walter L. Buenger, Secession Convention, TEX. ST. HIST. ASS’N (June 15, 2010),
https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mjs01 [hereinafter Buenger, Secession
Convention].
102 Id.
103 White, 74 U.S. at 704.
104 Id.
105 Buenger, Secession, supra note 98.
106 Id.
107 See White, 74 U.S. at 704 (noting that the ordinance was adopted by a vote of
34,794 to 11,235); RANDOLPH B. CAMPBELL, AN EMPIRE FOR SLAVERY: THE PECULIAR
INSTITUTION IN TEXAS, 1821–1865 229 (1989) (noting that Texans approved secession by
a different margin: 46,129 to 14,697).
100
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intimidated with threats of violence.108 Variations on this theme later
unfolded in Tennessee,109 Virginia,110 and Arkansas.111
Other states joined the Confederacy without pretense of a popular
referendum. They claimed the right to secede as an aspect of state
sovereignty, severing political and economic ties with the northern
states. The rest of the Union did not accept their departure. While the
southern states claimed rights of self-determination, the north
maintained that secession was beyond state authority. As the Supreme
Court would later affirm, the Constitution nowhere considers a right
of secession, nor does it provide for territorial referenda on the
question.112 The “rebellion” of the southern states, as it was framed in
the north, was ultimately quelled by force in a war that claimed over
600,000 lives.113 After a protracted and devastating conflict, the
southern forces were vanquished in 1865, the Constitution was

108 Buenger, Secession, supra note 98 (noting evidence of violence and intimidation,
and that “[f]ew opponents of secession spoke out on the eve of the secession referendum.
Most probably did not vote”).
109 E.g., NELSON & SHERIFF, supra note 20, at 54 (describing procedural irregularities,
voter fraud, military intimidation and other problems compromising the Tennessee
referendum). Tennessee held a statewide referendum choosing secession on June 8, 1861,
but the referendum was subsequent and secondary to the political determination that had
already been reached by the state government. Id. The legislature had already declared
secession, secession troops had already been mobilized, and pro-union meetings were
broken up. Id.
110 RICHARD ORR CURRY, A HOUSE DIVIDED: A STUDY OF STATEHOOD POLITICS AND
THE COPPERHEAD MOVEMENT IN WEST VIRGINIA 36–37 (1964) (describing fear and
intimidation preceding the Virginia referendum, including coerced oaths of loyalty to the
Confederacy even before the ballot was taken). Virginia’s referendum was held after
troops had already been marshalled, compromising neutral balloting in some areas of the
state. Id. Many votes, especially from the Union-leaning western portion of the state, were
lost or discarded and therefore never counted. Ratification of the Ordinance of Secession,
W. VA. ARCHIVES & HIST., http://www.wvculture.org/ history/statehood/statehood06.html
(last visited Oct. 15, 2017). In lieu of these missing ballots, the governor added to the final
count his own estimate of what he believed these votes would have been, Referendum on
Secession, LIBR. VA, http://edu.lva.virginia.gov/online_classroom/union_or_secession/unit
/10/referendum_on_secession (last visited Oct. 15, 2017), hastening West Virginia’s
secession from Virginia and from the Confederacy a few months later. West Virginia
Statehood, W. VA. ARCHIVES & HIST., http://www.wvculture.org/history/archives
/statehoo.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
111 MICHAEL B. DOUGAN, CONFEDERATE ARKANSAS: THE PEOPLE AND POLICIES OF A
FRONTIER STATE IN WARTIME 46 (1976) (describing threats and intimidation associated
with the Arkansas referendum).
112 See White, 74 U.S. at 726.
113 Civil War Facts, CIVIL WAR TRUST, http://www.civilwar.org/learn/articles/civil-war
-facts/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
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amended to forbid slavery in all forms, and the nation set to work
rebuilding itself for the second half of its existence.114
Yet even after it was clear that the nation would remain intact,
serious legal questions confronted the weakened Union. Secession
had been militarily blocked, but the question that would then
preoccupy the Supreme Court was: what happens now? How should
the nation interpret its new relationship with the would-be
secessionist states? They had disavowed their position within the
Union and then been forced back, but the new question was: were
they even still states? Or were they something else now? Given that
they had returned only by conquest, what did that mean for the
apparatus of state governments that were still intact (and which had
led the rebellion)? Did they have the same degree of sovereign
authority as before the war? Were their representatives eligible to
serve in Congress? Would they participate in governance over the rest
of the Union? Or were they now just conquered territory, subject to
direct federal rule until further dispositions were made?
The U.S. Supreme Court confronted the underlying question—
“were the Confederate states still states?”—in Texas v. White, an 1868
case addressing the comparatively arcane issue of whether Texas state
war bonds would be honored.115 To answer that question, the Court
first had to decide whether Texas had even been a state in the
immediate aftermath of the Civil War.116 After wrestling with the
issue and its implications, the Court ultimately concluded that Texas
was indeed a state, and had been for the purpose of resolving the war
bonds issue.117 Indeed, all the states that had attempted to secede
were still states, and had never stopped being states—because, simply
put, the U.S. Constitution does not allow for secession.118 As the
Court intoned, there is no secession in the United States.119 Therefore,
114

Id.
White, 74 U.S. at 700.
116 Id. at 724 (“Did Texas, in consequence of these acts, cease to be a State? Or, if not,
did the State cease to be a member of the Union?”).
117 Id. at 731 (“It suffices to say, that the terms of the acts necessarily imply recognition
of actually existing governments; and that in point of fact, the governments thus
recognized, in some important respects, still exist.”).
118 Id. at 726 (“The union between Texas and the other States was as complete, as
perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union between the original States. There was no place
for reconsideration, or revocation, except through revolution, or through consent of the
States.”).
119 Id. at 725 (“The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union
composed of indestructible States.”).
115
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whatever these states may have claimed, they hadn’t actually
seceded—they had just very badly misbehaved. More accurately, the
individuals involved had misbehaved—because the states themselves
had nothing to do with it.120
The Court observed that immediately after the war, the president
was entitled to establish a provisional government (composed of
leaders other than those that had led the rebellion) in order to fulfill
his constitutional duty to guarantee republican government
throughout the land.121 Since then, however, elections had been taken,
republican representation was in place, and Texas and its sister states
could return to normal constitutional status.122 Of note, during the
period of provisional governance after the war, the sitting legislature
took advantage of the temporary southern disenfranchisement in
Congress to pass the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,123
which guarantees equal protection of law to all people within its
jurisdiction, including former slaves in southern states.124 It is a great
irony, perhaps, that this critically important part of our Constitution,
articulating dearly held American ideals, arose during such
circumstances of procedural irregularity—but it is also suggestive of
the disorderliness, contingency, and occasionally improvisational
quality of governance during times of great historical challenge.125
Regardless, Texas v. White definitely interpreted the constitutional
boundaries of national-level secession, establishing that secession is
120

See id. at 727.
Id. at 729.
122 See id. at 731.
123 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
124 Id. The period immediately after the war was one of staggering political instability
for the United States. Even before the war’s end, the President’s December 8, 1863,
Proclamation to Congress envisioned a forced Union, but one that would invite the
southern delegations back to Washington to participate in federal governance. See
Proclamation No. 11, 13 Stat. 737 (1863). However, procedural irregularities, including
the sitting Congress’ refusal to seat the southern delegation, enabled Congress to enact (in
the absence of that delegation) what would become among the most important pieces of
the U.S. Constitution: the Fourteenth Amendment, promising equal protection of the law
to all people, including slaves. See Dyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266, 270–74 (Utah 1968)
(providing detailed recitations of the procedural irregularities resulting in this troubled
historical moment); Pinckney G. McElwee, The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and the Threat that it Poses to our Democratic Government, 11 S.C. L.Q.
484, 487–500 (1959).
125 But see generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS
(1998) (defending the origins of the Fourteenth Amendment on grounds that all procedural
irregularity has been subsequently legitimized by overwhelming legal, political, and
cultural ratification).
121
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unavailable within the U.S. constitutional order, unless the remaining
states all consent. Courts continue to heed this precedent today, as did
the Alaska Supreme Court in 2010, when it rejected the ballot
initiative proposing Alaskan secession.126 In that decision, the Alaska
justices quoted the memorable words of the U.S. Supreme Court in
White:
The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible
Union, composed of indestructible States. When, therefore, Texas
became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble
relation. All the obligations of perpetual union, and all the
guaranties of republican government in the Union, attached at once
to the State. The act which consummated her admission into the
Union was something more than a compact; it was the incorporation
of a new member into the political body. And it was final. The
union between Texas and other States was as complete, as
perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union between the original
States. There was no place for reconsideration, or revocation, except
through revolution, or through consent of the States.127

The Union is thus protected against all but consensual departure or
revolution—and that revolution, unlike the U.S. Civil War, must
succeed in order to accomplish its goals.
II
FEDERALISM IN THE UNITED STATES
In lieu of secession, the United States has developed a very
different model for working out regional conflict: the federal system
of governance, which divides sovereign power between a central
administration and regional subunits.128 In the United States,
separately sourced authority is vested in the national government and
fifty regional states.129 The Constitution confers enumerated
sovereign powers on the national government, while reserving
residual sovereign authority associated with the pre-constitutional
police powers of the states.130 The states further disseminate their
126 Kohlhaas v. State, 223 P.3d 105 (Alaska 2010) (discussed supra notes 34–37 and
accompanying text).
127 Id. at 110 n.22 (citing Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725–26 (1868)).
128 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 7–8.
129 See infra notes 135–46 (describing how authority is allocated among the national
and state governments).
130 See infra notes 135–146; see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 564–71 (2009)
(discussing the presumption against federal preemption of state authority under their
traditional “police powers” to protect the public).
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power locally among municipal agencies, and occasionally laterally,
in partnerships with other states by constitutionally permissible
interstate compacts.131
The innovation of federalism was first conceived during the
debates of the American Constitutional Convention of 1787, about a
decade after former colonies separated from Britain during the
American Revolution.132 The leaders of the newly independent states
had been forced to concede the failure of their first attempt at a
comparatively decentralized confederation (under the 1777 Articles of
Confederation), and they now sought to establish a more enduring
union that would better balance the competing objectives of
autonomy and interdependence that inform good pluralist
governance.133 Today, the dynamics of American federalism provide
multiple simultaneous pathways for regional dissent and
differentiation, interjurisdictional competition, and collaborative
governance.134
The availability of multiple sites for political contest and
innovation has proven useful for many reasons, but one of them is
surely the way that federalism effectively rechannels regional
frustration away from calls for secession and into a more cohesive
fabric of vibrant multilevel governance. This Part reviews the overall
structure of American federalism, the good governance values that
undergird it, and the role of federalism theory in navigating inevitable
constitutional uncertainty about how to reconcile competing values in
different policy contexts.

131 See generally FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE
INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE 1925 (1951).
132 See generally ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM (2010); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY (2007).
133 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 70–73.
134 See, e.g., id.; Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011)
[hereinafter Ryan, Negotiating Federalism]; Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War
Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV.
503 (2007) [hereinafter Ryan, Seeking Checks and Balance]; see also Erin Ryan,
Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, in THE LAW AND POLICY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 355 (Kalyani Robbins ed.,
2015) [hereinafter Ryan, Environmental Federalism]; Erin Ryan, The Once and Future
Challenges of American Federalism: The Tug of War Within, in 1 THE WAYS OF
FEDERALISM IN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE HORIZONS OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY
IN SPAIN 267 (Alberto López Basaguren & Leire Escajedo San Epifanio eds., 2013).
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A. The Structure and Function of American Federalism
American federalism is structured as a system of dual sovereignty,
constitutionally conferring certain sovereign powers on the new
national government while reserving others to the regional states that
predated the Union (and to those that would later follow, on “equal
footing” with the original states).135 The Constitution confers, or
“enumerates,” a list of powers for national governance, including both
specific powers (such as those over postal roads, copyrights, and
war)136 and comparatively open-ended powers (to tax and spend for
the public welfare, to regulate interstate commerce, and to regulate as
“necessary and proper” for carrying out other enumerated powers).137
Where legitimate national governance conflicts with state or local
law, the central (or “federal”) law has preemptive force under the
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.138 However, the Tenth
Amendment clarifies that those powers not delegated to the national
government are reserved to the states (or to the people),139 indicating
that separate sovereign authority is constitutionally intended at both
levels simultaneously.140
The existence of the Supremacy Clause implicitly recognizes that
there have always been areas of potential overlap between state and
national jurisdiction, and the increasing complexity of national
interdependence over time has widened the scope of jurisdictional
overlap141 (in addition to further overlap with municipal governance
within states, regional partnerships between states, and separately
sovereign American Indian tribes).142 Nevertheless, the structure of
dual sovereignty ensures that no level of government has absolute
authority, and neither the federal nor state governments can fully
displace the other. In congruence with the principle of subsidiarity,
regulatory matters are generally governed at the most local level with

135 See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566 (1911) (interpreting the equal footing
doctrine); RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 7–8.
136 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 7, 8, 11.
137 Id. cls. 1, 3, 18.
138 Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
139 Id. amend. X.
140 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 8–10.
141 Id. at 146–47.
142 See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism
All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34–44 (2010) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism
All the Way Down] (discussing the dynamics of jurisdictional overlap at multiple levels).
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capacity to resolve them.143 The constitutional enumeration of powers
tracks those regulatory arenas in which central governance is
presumed necessary, and leaves other matters to the competence of
state or local regulation.144 As such, the multiple American
sovereigns deal separately with those issues that fall within their
exclusive regulatory purviews, and they engage in ways ranging from
collaboration to competition to cope with issues that straddle
jurisdictional boundaries.145
While federalism diffuses authority vertically between the national
and state levels of government, related separation-of-powers doctrines
diffuse authority horizontally among the three branches of American
government146 (which are then replicated vertically downward within
each of the fifty states). As a result, the American system is easily
critiqued as confusing, prone to jurisdictional conflict, and needlessly
inefficient.147 Yet Americans generally tolerate these problems in
light of the benefits federalism has conferred in balancing our
competing political demands for local autonomy and national
interdependence. Demands for local autonomy, which predominate in
claims for secession, are addressed by the increased political agency
and independence available within state and local governance in the
federal system. These demands are moderated by the recognition of
national interdependence on matters that include national security,
commercial productivity, environmental protection, and the normative
commitments of constitutional law.
Ideally, federalism strengthens local autonomy and meaningful
self-determination by preserving state regulatory authority over
matters where state or local government have superior governing
capacity. For example, in the United States, traditional areas of state
and local competence include zoning, land use regulation, local
policing, and elections.148 Yet while federalism protects these zones
143

RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 59–60.
Id. at 61–63.
145 See id. at 265–70 (discussing various ways that state and federal actors cope with
jurisdictional overlap).
146 Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution: Navigating the
Separation of Powers Both Vertically and Horizontally, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 4,
5 (2015) [hereinafter Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution].
147 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 906–07 (1994). See also MALCOLM M. FEELEY
& EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE (2008)
(following up the earlier work).
148 RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at xii.
144
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of local autonomy, it does so within the bounds of strong central
authority for coping with the kinds of collective action problems that
can undermine atomistic local regulation—such as those that would
hamper the management of interstate commerce, boundary-crossing
environmental harms, or national defense.149 Local autonomy is also
constrained within the ambit of strong central authority for
vindicating national consensus on core constitutional rights, such as
freedom of expression and equal protection of the laws. American
federalism relies on national power to ensure that these rights are
upheld, even when enforcing them requires overriding local
autonomy in a given circumstance.150 For example, even if you live in
a region of the country where the majority of citizens wish you and
your political party would stop speaking, your rights to engage in
political speech will be protected, even against contrary state or local
laws.151
B. Federalism as a Strategy for Good Governance
In pursuit of this elusive balance, federalism in the United States
and elsewhere is thus designed to cultivate the “sweet spot” between
fully local and fully centralized governance, encouraging regulatory
systems in which decisions are made at the level where they make the
most sense. Importantly, however, and often overlooked in the older
literature, federalism’s “sweet spot” is dynamic and subject to
renegotiation over time, through the processes of competition and
collaboration that are facilitated by healthy multilevel governance.152
While American federalism is often characterized as a naked contest
between state and federal power, it is better understood as a site of
negotiation in which political actors at various levels of government
149 See Ryan, Environmental Federalism, supra note 134, at 362–66 (discussing the
role of American federalism in policing collective action problems and enforcing core
constitutional promises).
150 U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV.
151 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (invalidating state laws
criminalizing desecration of the American flag for violating the First Amendment’s
protection of symbolic speech).
152 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 266–67 (discussing negotiated federal
governance); Ryan, Environmental Federalism, supra note 134, at 412–13 (drawing
examples of negotiated governance from environmental law); see also Heather K. Gerken,
Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1784–85 (2005) [hereinafter Gerken,
Dissenting by Deciding]; Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative
Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1258–60 (2009) [hereinafter Uncooperative
Federalism]; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 134, at 4–5.
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to work out a continually shifting balance between competing good
governance values.153 Indeed, the best way to understand federalism
in general, and perhaps American federalism in particular, is in terms
of these underlying values.
Federalism is, at its heart, a strategy for good governance—based
on a set of clear values that we hope federalism will help us
accomplish.154 In a previous book, Federalism and the Tug of War
Within, and other work, I extrapolate five foundational values that
American federalism is designed to advance, based on analysis of the
legislative history of the Constitutional Convention, later Supreme
Court interpretations, congressional and executive pronouncements,
and the academic literature.155 These emphasize the maintenance of
(1) checks and balances between opposing centers of power that
protect individuals, (2) governmental accountability and transparency
that enhance democratic participation, (3) local autonomy that enables
interjurisdictional innovation and competition, (4) centralized
authority to manage collective action problems and vindicate core
constitutional promises, and finally (5) the regulatory problemsolving synergy that federalism enables between the unique
governance capacities of local and national actors for coping with
problems that neither can resolve alone.156
As I have described in this previous work, governance in pursuit of
these values advances individual dignity within healthy

153

See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at xi–xii.
Id. at xiv.
155 Id. at 34−67. In the original book and Article, I discuss the four federalism values
most directly voiced in American federalism jurisprudence: checks and balances,
transparency and accountability, localism values, and the problem-solving value implied
by subsidiarity. The values of centralized authority are implied by the value of
intergovernmental problem-solving synergy, but in later exploration of the material, I
added more overt discussion of how centralized power counterbalances localism values
within federalism. See Ryan, Environmental Federalism, supra note 134, at 362–64.
Because they are implicit in the creation of an overall nation-state, the values of central
administration are debated less directly in the many cases that presume centralized
national authority but debate its appropriate relationship with subnational authority.
However, as the discourse has progressed, I believe it is worth highlighting it more
explicitly as the fifth in the series.
156 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at xiv, 34–67 (specifically detailing the
values of checks, transparency, localism, and synergy and dealing more holistically with
the nationalism values necessarily implied by a federal system); Ryan, Environmental
Federalism, supra note 134, at 362–64 (summarizing these and explicitly adding
centralized authority).
154
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communities.157 It enhances democratic governance principles of
self-determination while recognizing the responsibilities that group
members hold toward one another. It creates a laboratory for
innovations in governance from multiple possible sources158 and
facilitates multiple planes of negotiation among competing interests
and interest groups.159 It appropriately honors both sides of the
subsidiarity principle—the directive to solve problems at the most
local level possible160—which notably couples its preference for local
autonomy in governance with the expectation of effective regulatory
problem-solving (and by implication, at whatever level will achieve
it).161 Good federalism-sensitive governance is especially powerful at
diffusing the kinds of regional tension that could foment secession
under other circumstances.
Nevertheless, identifying what federalism is designed to
accomplish is only the first part of the puzzle. The harder task is
figuring out how these goals fit together. The core federalism values
are doubtlessly all good things in and of themselves, and American
governance has long aspired to realize each of them independently.
Yet our success has been complicated by the fact that each individual
value is suspended in a web of tensions with the others. No matter
how we may try, the hard truth is that they all cannot always be
satisfied simultaneously in any given context. The regulatory choices
we make inevitably involve tradeoffs, in which one value may
157 The following description of the original work in RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note
16, at 34–67, closely tracks my description of it in a later work, Ryan, Environmental
Federalism, supra note 134, at 362–64.
158 For the most famous statement of this principle, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (comparing the states to laboratories in
which to “try novel social and economic experiments”).
159 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 265–367 (discussing negotiated
federalism among the various levels and branches of government). See generally Ryan,
Negotiating Federalism, supra note 134 (introducing the analysis that evolved into this
final part of the book).
160 See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond
Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103 (2001). For various accounts of the subsidiarity principle,
see David P. Currie, Subsidiarity, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 359 (1998); James L. Huffman,
Making Environmental Regulation More Adaptive Through Decentralization: The Case
for Subsidiarity, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1377 (2004); John F. Stinneford, Subsidiarity,
Federalism, and Federal Prosecution of Street Crime, 2 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 495
(2005); W. Gary Vause, The Subsidiarity Principle in European Union Law—American
Federalism Compared, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 61 (1995); Jared Bayer, Comment,
Re-Balancing State and Federal Power: Toward a Political Principle of Subsidiarity in
the United States, 53 AM. U.L. REV. 1421 (2004).
161 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 59–66.
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partially eclipse another.162 Conflicts between localism and
nationalism are obvious, but the network of tension runs much deeper
and among all the various values.
For example, consider the tension between the values of (1) checks
on sovereign authority and (2) transparent and accountable
government. Federalism promotes a balanced system of checks on
sovereign authority at both the state and federal level,163 enabling the
useful tool of governance that I have previously called “regulatory
backstop,” which protects individuals against government excess or
abdication by either side.164 When sovereign authority at one level
fails to protect the vulnerable, regulatory backstop ensures that it
remains available to do so at a different level.
The history of American civil rights law reveals especially famous
examples, including periods in which the federal government
protected the rights of African Americans forsaken by state law165
and more modern examples in which states have acted first to protect
rights unrecognized by federal law, including those of LGBT
citizens166 and the owners of property subject to eminent domain.167
Environmental law showcases equally compelling examples of dual
sovereignty at its best,168 including the 1970s era in which the federal
government acted to prevent excessive air and water pollution when
most states had failed to do so,169 and the current era in which many
162

See id. at 38–39 (and more generally at 34–67).
Id. at 39–44 (discussing checks and balances).
164 Id. at 42–43 (discussing regulatory backstop).
165 See, e.g., Marilyn K. Howard, Discrimination, in 1 THE JIM CROW ENCYCLOPEDIA
222, 226–27 (Nikki L.M. Brown & Barry M. Stentiford eds., 2008).
166 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-401 to -402 (2007) (barring discrimination in
hiring based on sexual orientation); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2009) (amending marriage
definition from union between a man and woman to a union between two people); see
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (asserting that the
Massachusetts constitution is more protective of civil rights than the federal Constitution
in invalidating a state statutory ban on same-sex marriages). More recently, the Supreme
Court removed an important federal obstacle to state efforts to legalize gay marriage. See
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (U.S. 2013) (invalidating parts of the federal
Defense of Marriage Act); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (U.S. 2015) (establishing
a federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage); cf. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding,
supra note 152 (discussing San Francisco’s decision to issue gay marriage licenses despite
contrary state law).
167 See, e.g., Tim Hoover, Eminent Domain Reform Signed, KAN. CITY STAR, July 14,
2006, at B2 (reporting on new state law property rights).
168 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at xxvii–xxix.
169 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401
(2006).
163
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states are moving to address the causes and effects of climate change
at a time when the national government has not succeeded.170
The availability of regulatory backstop, however, exacts a price.
The very maintenance of checks and balances between state and
national actors itself frustrates the independent value of transparency,
making it harder for the average citizen to navigate the lines of
governmental accountability (and know whom to blame for bad
policy choices).171 This is especially problematic in realms of
extreme jurisdictional overlap, such as environmental or criminal law,
where legitimate state and federal governance takes place
simultaneously.172
As I describe in Federalism and the Tug of War Within, if all we
cared about were the good governance values of transparency and
accountability, the best alternative would be a unitary system of
government, such as that used in China.173 Alternatively, if checks
and balances were the primary governance ideal, then we should do
away with the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause,174 which gives the
national government a powerful edge in many state-federal
conflicts.175 If localism values were primary, then our best course of
action would be a confederal system among powerful states and a
weak center, lacking federal constitutional supremacy (not unlike the
nation’s first experiment with the Articles of Confederation).176
Instead, Americans tolerate the open tension between checks and
transparency, and the obvious conflicts between localism and strong
national power, and all the other tradeoffs that palpably manifest
among the five values—precisely to reap the federalism-facilitated
benefits of local autonomy when desirable, national uniformity when
preferable,
regulatory
backstop
when
necessary,
and

170 See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Whither Subnational Climate Change Initiatives in the
Wake of Federal Climate Legislation?, 39 PUBLIUS 432 (2009); Kirsten Engel, State and
Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Motivating State and Local Governments to
Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental
Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006).
171 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 43–50.
172 See id. at 145–80.
173 Id. at 48.
174 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
175 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 43–44.
176 See id. Notably, this unsuccessful experiment was rejected in favor of true
federalism. See id.
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interjurisdictional problem-solving when inevitable.177 Strong local
authority expands opportunities for democratic participation,
encourages well-tailored governance, facilitates diversity, inspires
innovation, and encourages interjurisdictional competition.178 Strong
national power resolves collective action problems, facilitates
markets, manages border-crossing harms and large-scale public
commons, speaks to the world with a unitary voice, and vindicates
nonnegotiable constitutional promises.179 Ideally, coupling healthy
local authority with strong national power facilitates the kind of
dynamic interjurisdictional synergy in governance that makes for the
most effective regulatory response—drawing on the distinctive forms
of governance capacity that develop respectively at the local and
national level to solve pressing interjurisdictional problems that
require both.180
C. Constitutional Indeterminacy and Federalism Theory
With values-based competition implicit in all federalism
quandaries, each dilemma demands that decision-makers choose,
consciously or otherwise, how to prioritize among these conflicting
federalism values. Navigating that tension toward resolution usually
provides good direction on the associated issue of where to assign
regulatory responsibility along the continuum from local to national
governance, but it is not always conclusive.181 Allocating authority
and reconciling these competing values are daunting tasks, and
ongoing federalism controversies in such realms as environmental
law, health care law, immigration, marriage rights, and religious
expression highlight the deep interpretive tensions involved in
navigating American federalism.182
Indeed, these controversies underscore the fundamental problem
for managing federalism in the United States, which is that of
177

See id. at 34–67.
See id. at 50–59.
179 See, e.g., EDWARD MILLICAN, ONE UNITED PEOPLE: THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND
THE NATIONAL IDEA (1990).
180 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 59–66, 145–80, 265–367. See generally
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 134 (exploring intergovernmental bargaining as
a means of harnessing interjurisdictional synergy).
181 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 8–17, 145–80 (discussing inherent
indeterminacy in the Constitution’s federalism directives and the resulting
interjurisdictional gray area in federalism sensitive governance).
182 See Ryan, Environmental Federalism, supra note 134, at 2–3 and accompanying
notes (listing ongoing federalism controversies in American governance).
178
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constitutional indeterminacy. The American Constitution mandates—
but incompletely describes—the system of dual sovereignty implied
by the various federalism directives scattered throughout its text.183
Applying these directives in the absence of clearer constraints
necessarily requires interpreters to rely, consciously or otherwise, on
some exogenous theory of federalism for help—to fill in the
constitutional blanks that inevitably arise when these relatively vague
federalism directives are applied to specific cases and
controversies.184 The theoretical tools employed must be consistent
with constitutional mandates, but they cannot be found entirely within
the document itself. Those tasked with policymaking and adjudication
need some kind of operating theory to interpret it.
As a result, American federalism jurisprudence has vacillated
substantially over time, as the Supreme Court, Congress, and other
interpreters have experimented with different theoretical models to fill
in these blanks.185 At various points in American history, including
the early years of the republic and during the Supreme Court’s “New
Federalism revival” of the 1990s, the Court grounded its federalism
adjudication in an idealized model of “dual federalism.”186 Dual
federalism privileges the check-and-balance value in idealizing a
system of mutually exclusive state and federal jurisdictional
spheres—notwithstanding the marked departure of this ideal from the
reality of an American system suffused with jurisdictional overlap.187
By contrast, the preferred model of federalism during the New
Deal era of the 1940s and the Great Society era of the 1960s
183 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at xiv. These directives include powers
enumerated to the different branches of government in various articles and amendments
(for example, those delegated to Congress under Article I, Section 8 or Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment), the recognition of ongoing state authority in various articles and
amendments (for example, the responsibilities for national elections conferred in Article 1,
Section 2, and Article II, Section 1), and the relationship between them suggested by the
Tenth Amendment. See id. at 8–9.
184 See id. at 7–33 (discussing the possibility of multiple models of American
federalism, all consistent with constitutional directives).
185 See id. at 68–104 (analyzing the different theoretical models of federalism in use
over the history of American governance and jurisprudence).
186 See id. at 98–104, 109–44 (reviewing dual federalism and analyzing the Rehnquist
Court’s New Federalism revival).
187 See MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 8, 60–153 (Daniel J. Elazar ed.,
2d ed. 1984); RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 145–80 (reviewing the
interjurisdictional challenge to dual federalism). In fact, jurisdictional overlap is so
prevalent in American governance that it has been famously compared to “marble cake,”
with entangled swirls of interlocking local and national law. See id. at xii.
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privileged nationalism in service to the problem-solving value—
elevating the need for strong federal power to solve critical societal
problems after the Great Depression and during the Civil Rights
Movement—but with less regard for the values of checks, localism, or
accountability (and arguably fomenting the social frustration that
would later lead to the modern New Federalism and Tea Party
Movements).188 The federalism discourse is only just beginning to
appreciate how this unresolved “tug of war” for privilege among
competing federalism values has led to the Supreme Court’s
notoriously fluctuating federalism jurisprudence.189
Notwithstanding the dual federalism model that continues to
influence the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the model of
cooperative federalism predominates in the actual practice of
federalism-sensitive
governance.190
Cooperative
federalism
acknowledges the reality of jurisdictional overlap between legitimate
state and federal interests, and it allows for regulatory partnerships in
which state and federal actors take responsibility for interlocking
parts of a larger regulatory whole.191 This model seeks a middle
ground between the excessive jurisdictional separation of pure dual
federalism and the fear that New Deal federalism would obliterate
dual sovereignty. Nevertheless, the critics of cooperative federalism

188 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 84–88, 98–104 (reviewing New Deal
Federalism and the rise of New Federalism and the Tea Party).
189 The literature on American federalism has exploded in recent years with interesting
new perspectives on dynamic and innovative federalism theory. While all sources are too
numerous to list, a worthy tour would include: ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING
GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2008); JOHN D. NUGENT,
SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL
POLICYMAKING (2009); Rubin & Feeley, supra note 147; RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note
16; ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 1077 (2014); Uncooperative Federalism, supra note 152; William W. Buzbee,
Interaction’s Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism
Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145 (2007); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of
Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006); Gerken,
Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 142; Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National]
Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2014). More traditional and historical perspectives are
also an important part of the recent federalism discourse: see, e.g., JENNA BEDNAR, THE
ROBUST FEDERATION: PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN (2009); MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDEDOWN CONSTITUTION (2012); LACROIX, supra note 132; PURCELL, supra note 132.
190 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 89–98 (reviewing cooperative
federalism).
191 Id. at 94–95.
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variously assail the model as overly ad hoc, undertheorized, and
coercive.192
In response to shortcomings in these paradigmatic models, a host
of new scholarship is developing newer theoretical conceptions of
American federalism,193 including the Balanced Federalism model
that I proposed in Federalism and the Tug of War Within.194 Balanced
Federalism emphasizes dynamic interaction among the various levels
of government and shared interpretive responsibility among the three
branches of government, with the overall goal of achieving a balance
among the competing federalism values that is both dynamic and
adaptive over time.195 The full elaboration in the book helps provide
the missing theoretical justification for the tools of cooperative
federalism that predominate in modern American governance, as well
as support for future moves by environmental governance toward
even greater dynamic engagement.196 It emphasizes the skillful
deployment of legislative, executive, and judicial capacity at each
level of federalism-sensitive governance, allocating authority based
on the specific forms of decision-making in which they excel.197
These newer theoretical models demonstrate how well-crafted
multi-scalar governance deflates the more traditional presumption of
192 See id. at 96–98 (discussing frustration with cooperative federalism), 273–76
(discussing the federalism safeguards debate); see also GREVE, supra note 189 (assailing
cooperative federalism as coercive and collusive).
193 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 189; GREVE, supra note 189; SCHAPIRO, supra
note 189.
194 See generally RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16.
195 See id. at 181–214, 265–70, 339–670 (discussing what the Balanced Federalism
model involves).
[A] series of innovations to bring judicial, legislative, and executive efforts to
manage [the tug of war] into more fully theorized focus. [Balanced Federalism]
mediates the tensions within federalism on three separate planes: (1) fostering
balance among the competing federalism values, (2) leveraging the functional
capacities of the three branches of government in interpreting federalism, and (3)
maximizing the wisdom of both state and federal actors in so doing. [This initial
foray] imagines three successive means of coping with the values tug of war
within federalism, each experimenting with different degrees of judicial and
political leadership at different levels of government. Along the way, the analysis
provides clearer theoretical justification for the ways in which the tug of war is
already legitimately mediated through various forms of balancing, compromise,
and negotiation.
Id. at xi–xii.
196 See generally id.
197 See id.; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution, supra note
146.
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“zero-sum federalism,” a misunderstanding of state-federal relations
with roots in dual federalism that continues to haunt the American
discourse.198 Zero-sum conceptualizations of federalism assume that
the state and federal governments are locked in an antagonistic,
winner-takes-all competition for power, in which every victory by one
side constitutes a loss for the other.199 While this is sometimes
true,200 closer examination of federalism-sensitive governance reveals
that the line between state and federal power is just as often a project
of negotiation, through ongoing processes of consultation and
coordination that can afford advantages to both sides.201
Understanding federalism as a project of continual negotiation among
all levels of government—preserving both regional preferences and
national commitments—is a critical feature of healthy multilevel
governance, and one that has helped strengthen the American Union
against the forces of fragmentation.202
III
NATIONHOOD AMID FORCES OF POLITICAL ENTROPY AND GRAVITY
American federalism has surely helped galvanize the United States
against further efforts to disassociate,203 but it is also important to
recognize the limitations of American federalism, and perhaps
federalism in general, when the pressures toward secession are most
manifest. Federalism is a useful strategy for good governance in many
pluralist societies, and an alternative favored over secession by

198 Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution, supra note 146, at
25; see also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 134, at 4–5.
199 Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution, supra note 146, at
25; see also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 134, at 4–5.
200 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (holding most of a state
immigration statute preempted by federal law).
201 See Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution, supra note 146,
at 25; see also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 134, at 4–5.
202 See Alice Kaswan, Cooperative Federalism and Adaptation, in THE LAW AND
POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 188 (Kalyani
Robbins ed., 2015); Hannah J. Wiseman, Evolving Energy Federalism: Current
Allocations of Authority and the Need for Inclusive Governance, in LAW AND POLICY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 114 (Kalyani Robbins ed.,
2015).
203 See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633,
657 (1991) (“Any society that constitutes its government through a federal system—one
that embodies a decision to allow for movement among states and to limit the scope of
national law—necessarily creates a built-in safeguard against political or economic
oppression,” and accordingly, Sunstein argues, secession.).
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generally accepted principles of international law204—but it cannot
solve all problems, nor can it overcome all obstacles. Nor is the
American model appropriate in all political contexts. Drawing from
the U.S. example and that of other federal nations, this Part offers
observations about the core dynamics with which federal systems
must contend in any context, and that exert pressure on federal unions
toward the extremes of further fragmentation or further centralization.
A. The U.S. Model and the Alternatives
First, it is important to acknowledge the critical differences
between federalism in the United States and elsewhere that may limit
the transferability of lessons from the American experience at all.
Federalism operates very differently between the United States and,
say, Europe—because there are very different demands on the
institution in each place, relating to the substantially greater regional
diversity that exists in Europe for reasons of history, culture, and
geography. While there is significant cultural, ethnic, and ideological
diversity within the United States, it is far less regionally specific than
it is among the nation states of Europe (and even within some of
them, such as Belgium, Switzerland, or Spain), where distinct
regional groups maintain separate languages, religions, and other
social organizing principles.205
In the United States, cultural and political diversity within
individual states can be even greater than it is between separate states,
so state-based diversity is less likely to cleave along uniform racial,
ethnic, or linguistic lines.206 In the European Union, and within
federal European nation-states with regionally distinctive ethnic or
language subcultures, federalism operates more directly as a
vindicator of local autonomy among cultural groups that may not
otherwise be willing to cooperate.207 In facilitating shared governance
204

See In re Secession of Québec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 222, 292 (Can.).
Cf. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 147; SCHAPIRO, supra note 189 (noting that
substantial U.S. cultural diversity is much more diffuse than regionally concentrated).
206 See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 147; see also SCHAPIRO, supra note 189.
207 See, e.g., Vernon Bogdanor, Forms of Autonomy and the Protection of Minorities,
126 DAEDALUS 65 (1997) (discussing the persistence of regionally based religious conflict
in Switzerland until constitutional federalism was used to reconcile differences between
Protestant and Catholic cantons). Federalism has also been suggested as a means for
governing Iraq. Renad Mansour, Rethinking Recognition: The Case of Iraqi Kurdistan, 3
CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1182 (2014). In fact, the Iraqi Kurds have declared a
“federal region” in the northern third of the country to protect their autonomy. Matt
205
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by historically independent populations, federalism does a wholly
different job in Europe—and even in Canada—than it does in the
United States, where the differences between the original thirteen
British colonies were far less meaningful.
For this reason, observations about American federalism may be
appropriately limited to its context, and a fuller inquiry would more
deeply engage other models of devolution in constitutional design.
These might include models of “asymmetrical federalism,” in which
different subnational constituents with similar constitutional status are
granted different powers and degrees of autonomy,208 in contrast to
the U.S. model of symmetrical federalism, in which all states possess
equivalent authority in an identical relationship to the national
government.209 Canada,210 India,211 Russia,212 and several other
nations with formal federal systems use different varieties of
asymmetrical federalism, and several unitary nations without formal
federalism use related systems of devolution, including the United
Kingdom,213 Spain,214 and Indonesia.215 Importantly, the literature on

Bradley et al., Kurds Declare ‘Federal Region’ in Syria, Says Official, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
24, 2016, 12:41 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/kurds-declare-federal-region-in-syria
-says-official-1458216404. However, some suggest that dissolution into regional subunits
may be preferable. See Tim Arango, Reviving an Old Idea for Iraq Still in Turmoil:
Splitting it Up, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2016, at A6.
208 See,
e.g., ALIXANDRA FUNK, ASYMMETRICAL FEDERALISM IN THE
MULTINATIONAL FEDERATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ASYMMETRICAL
FEDERALISM IN CANADA AND SPAIN (2010); Alain-G. Gagnon, Taking Stock of
Asymmetrical Federalism in an Era of Exacerbated Centralization, in CONTEMPORARY
CANADIAN FEDERALISM: FOUNDATIONS, TRADITIONS, INSTITUTIONS (Alain-G. Gagnon
ed., 2006); R. Michael Stevens, Asymmetrical Federalism: The Federal Principle and the
Survival of the Small Republic, 7 PUBLIUS 177 (1977).
209 See Alfred C. Stepan, Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model, 10 J.
DEMOCRACY 19 (1999).
210 See Gagnon, supra note 208.
211 See M. Govinda Rao & Nirvikar Singh, Asymmetric Federalism in India (U.C.
Santa Cruz, Working Paper No. 04–08, 2004), http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0v599
42g.pdf;origin=repeccitec.
212 See Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Asymmetric Federalism in Russia: Cure or Poison?,
in FISCAL FRAGMENTATION IN DECENTRALIZED COUNTRIES: SUBSIDIARITY, SOLIDARITY
AND ASYMMETRY 227 (Richard M. Byrd & Robert D. Ebel eds., 2007).
213 See ANDREW BLICK & GEORGE JONES, A FEDERAL FUTURE FOR THE UK: THE
OPTIONS 7 (2010), http://www.lse.ac.uk/government/Publications/A-Federal-Future-for
-the-UK.pdf.
214 See Joan Marc Simon, Federalism and the Future of Spain, FED. UNION (Oct. 5,
2011), http://www.federalunion.org.uk/federalism-and-the-future-of-spain/.
215 See Jacques Bertrand, Indonesia’s Quasi-Federalist Approach: Accommodation
Amid Strong Integrationist Tendencies, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 576 (2007).
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constitutional design in ethnically divided societies would also be of
great service to this larger project.216
Even so, some commonalities can be found among pluralist
societies coping with regional tension, about which the U.S.
experience remains informative.
B. The Forces of Fragmentation and Centralization
Most patent are the forces of fragmentation and centralization that
are ever-present in pluralist societies, in the United States and beyond.
When political conflicts become severe, fragmentation can foment
violent movements for secession, as the United States experienced
during its Civil War,217 although it can also lead to consensual
disassociation, as between Norway and Sweden,218 the Czech
Republic and Slovakia,219 and as may be happening today in
Belgium.220 At the same time, the counterbalancing forces of political
interdependence can help hold a union together, or (as some critics
argue has occurred in the United States) overly consolidate central
power.221 In each case, federalism must contend with the opposing
political forces of entropy and gravity.

216 See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES: INTEGRATION OR
ACCOMMODATION? (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2008); Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional
Design: Proposals Versus Processes, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY:
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, AND DEMOCRACY 15 (Andrew
Reynolds ed., 2002); Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?, 42
NOMOS 253 (2000).
217 See supra Part I.B.
218 Margaret Moore, On National Self-Determination, 45 POL. STUD. 900, 910 (1997)
(discussing the 1905 secession of Norway from Sweden); Øyvind Østerud, Introduction:
The Peculiarities of Norway, 28 W. EUR. POL. 705, 706 (2005). But see Glen M.E. Duerr,
Peaceful and Mutual Parliamentary Dissolution: Dissolved Unions in Sweden-Norway
(1905) and Czechoslovakia (1993) and Their Lessons for Europe, 35 SPRAWY
NARODOWOSCIOWE 29, 38 (2009) (noting that Norway’s unilateral declaration of
independence surprised Sweden, and that “[s]ome Swedish ministers advocated war to
retain Norway”).
219 Duerr, supra note 218, at 39 (noting that Czechoslovakia’s disassociation truly was
a peaceful “[v]elvet [d]ivorce”).
220 Id. at 32 (discussing the potential disassociation of Belgium); Bogdanor, supra note
207, at 65 (discussing the potential failure of Belgian federalism to reconcile the
competing interests of distinct linguistic communities).
221 See infra note 236 (discussing the Tea Party, Tenther, and New Federalism
movements).
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1. Political Entropy: Toward Disassociation
With regard to those forces that operate to pull polities apart,
federal unions must endure considerable pressures toward
disassociation.222 Federalism may strive for that “sweet spot”
between local autonomy and national interdependence, but it only
works when there is broad enough agreement on an overarching
national purpose. In the United States and elsewhere, successful
federalism hinges on there being enough shared values to support the
national consensus that a central government is empowered to protect
against competing local impulses. When the national consensus
breaks down, so does the legitimacy of enabling centralized
government to trump local autonomy.
Drawing from the example of the American Civil War, regional
conflict fulminated into full-blown rebellion when the consensus
between northern and southern states broke down over conflicting
constitutional provisions regarding human rights and slavery. Setting
aside pressing questions about the morality of the southern position,
the loss of sufficient national consensus weakened the perceived
legitimacy of national power among southern secessionists. After all,
from their perspective, what legitimizes the exercise of national
power against local autonomy if there is no longer a national
consensus for it to enforce? For this reason, federal unions must work
hard against the forces of political entropy that can draw distinctive
regional subcultures farther and farther apart, pushing for regulatory
decision-making at the more local or regional level.

222 While the legal literature focuses on whether there are international or domestic
rights to secession as a legal matter, the political science and moral philosophy literature is
rich with compelling discussion on whether there are moral rights to secession that flow
from legitimate political claims for self-determination. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER
WELLMAN, A THEORY OF SECESSION: THE CASE FOR POLITICAL SELF-DETERMINATION
(2005); Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J. PHIL. 439
(1990) (setting forth moral justification for a conditional right to self-determination by
members of an encompassing group); Christopher H. Wellman, A Defense of Secession
and Political Self-Determination, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 142 (1995) (arguing for a hybrid
model of political justification for a limited right secession, when its proponents have a
legitimate claim for self-determination and the resulting new state is able to perform the
rights-protective functions of government without too much externalized harm); Allen
Buchanan, Theories of Secession, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (1997) (arguing in favor of
remedial rights-based justifications for secession over ascriptive or associative group
rights-based justifications); David Copp, International Law and Morality in the Theory of
Secession, 2 J. ETHICS 219 (1998) (arguing for a broad right of secession among territorial
and political societies). But see Sunstein, supra note 203 (arguing against formalizing
rights of secession within constitutional systems).
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In extreme cases, however, where regionally-related conflict has
fractured a nation beyond repair, separation may be the only effective
remedy—or at least a remedy that seems morally justified.223 As the
author of one International Court of Justice opinion acknowledged in
assessing Kosovo’s bid for independence from Serbia, claims for
secession are especially persuasive in circumstances showing extreme
oppression, disenfranchisement, or marginalization of a regional
group within the overall nation.224
For example, the United States and other world leaders supported
the secession of South Sudan from the Republic of Sudan in 2011,
after fifty years of post-colonial civil war and entrenched regional
conflict over ethnic and religious violence, access to valuable natural
resources, and political marginalization.225 Tragically, further
fragmentation along tribal lines continues to fray the new nation even
after independence, as local militias that formed during the civil wars
engage in violent competition over political power and oil
revenues.226 Although oppression by the north was alleviated by its
secession, South Sudan’s ongoing struggles with poverty and
corruption are increasingly exacerbated by more local ethnic rivalries

223 See also Buchanan, supra note 222, at 34–38 (arguing that remedial rights-based
claims for secession are most justifiable, because, consistent with Lockean theory of
revolution, “[w]hen the people suffer prolonged and serious injustices, the people will
rise”). Writing in 1997, Professor Buchanan referenced genocidal policies against the
Kurds in northern Iraq to demonstrate the basis for a remedial right of secession—an
especially poignant example given failed Kurdish independence referendum that would
follow twenty years later in 2017. See infra text accompanying notes 239–43 (discussing
the contemporary secession movement in Iraqi Kurdistan).
224 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶¶ 166–68, 176, 205–08, 217 (July
22) (separate opinion by Trindade, J.) (summarizing recent atrocities in Kosovo, arguing
that self-determination becomes a right of severely subjugated peoples, and concluding
that international respect for territorial integrity is waived by states that practice ethnic
cleansing). See also Joel Day, Research Paper, The Remedial Right to Succession,
POTENTIA 19, 20 (2012) (arguing that ICJ precedent understands self-determination as the
externally recognized self-governance of an “insular, often oppressed, minority” within a
state and that “the crux of the matter is whether possessing a state is a universal right or if
groups may only secede in response to human rights violations”).
225 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Struggle Over, Independent South Sudan Rejoices, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2011, at A6 (discussing the secession of South Sudan).
226 See Max Fisher, 9 Questions About South Sudan You Were Too Embarrassed to
Ask, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews
/wp/2013/12/30/9-questions-about-south-sudan-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask/
(discussing ongoing ethnic strife in South Sudan).
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within the new nation227—perhaps lending sad credence to concerns
that secession can sometimes exacerbate the ethnic conflicts that give
rise to secession in the first place.228 Governing South Sudan amid
such extreme fragmentation—or at least protecting its most
vulnerable people in the meanwhile—remains an urgent international
challenge.229
2. Political Gravity: Toward Interconnection
The forces of political entropy are thus formidable, but opposing
forces of political gravity operate simultaneously to pull federal
participants closer and closer together, especially in the present day.
Federalism nurtures the “sweet spot” between autonomy and
interdependence, but the forces of interdependence have been
gathering strength over time.230 Few communities exist in full
isolation of others now, if they ever did. People migrate, intermarry,
and interact across cultural and geographical boundaries. Activities
within one community can cause changes within others. Disparate
polities help and harm one another by the choices they make,
purposefully or otherwise. Within federalism, the principle of
subsidiarity directs that regulatory decisions be taken at the most local
level possible, but the same rationale preempts fully local
management of regulatory problems with boundary-crossing or
“spillover” impacts to neighboring communities, where other local
governments lack the legal or practical capacity to respond.231 Indeed,
the list of regulatory issues threatening spillover impacts grows larger
as the global village grows seemingly smaller. Climate change,
refugee crises, regional political instability, international markets, the

227 See Jeffrey Gettleman, City of Hope in South Sudan is Now One of Fear, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2016, at A1 (describing local rivalries).
228 See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 222, at 45 (noting that secession can exacerbate the
ethnic conflicts that led to the secession because when one ethnic minority secedes, that
often creates new ethnic minorities with new grievances, or reverses prior patters of
grievances); Sunstein, supra note 203, at 634 (arguing that recognizing rights of secession
“would increase the risks of ethnic and factional struggle”).
229 Rick Gladstone, U.N. Peacekeeping Chief Issues Warning on South Sudan, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/world/africa/south-sudan
-war.html?_r=0 (“The leader of United Nations’ peacekeeping operations offered a dire
appraisal of South Sudan on Tuesday, saying the world’s youngest nation is sliding further
into mayhem with no sign that its antagonists want peace.”).
230 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 145–80; see also Ryan, Seeking Checks
and Balance, supra note 134, at 567–95.
231 See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 59–66.
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Internet, and diseases like Ebola, Zika, and measles all exemplify the
ways in which we are ever more interconnected.
The complexity of the modern world—in which we are bound
together along planes of international public health, multinational
commercial enterprise, global environmental systems, and
international corridors of travel and migration—means that there are
fewer and fewer truly local decisions that can be made without
boundary-crossing consequences.232 Regional subdivisions within a
state, let alone nation-states themselves, can hardly make policy in
these arenas without accounting for the decisions of others, or the
impacts of their own decisions on others. But if one group’s decisions
will have meaningful consequences beyond its jurisdictional
boundaries, what justifies that group’s authority to make decisions for
others?
The legitimacy of strong local authority to contradict national
policy is weakened when the decisions locals wish to make have
consequences beyond their own jurisdictional boundaries.233 This
intuition underlies many modern assertions of national authority in
unions like the United States, where increasing commercial,
environmental, and health-related sources of national interdependence
have justified new regulatory reach from the center.234
C. Suspended Between Autonomy and Interdependence
The forces of political gravity, pushing for regulatory decision
making at the central level, can thus mitigate claims for regional
autonomy at the very same time that the forces of political entropy
strain against claims for national authority.
In a healthy federal system—one that has maintained the “sweet
spot” over time—these forces will operate in opposition, fortifying
the union against challenges from both extremes. The durability of the
American union suggests a solid balance—although critics from both
sides alternatively complain that the American federation either

232

See sources cited supra note 230.
See sources cited supra note 230.
234 See, e.g., RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at 145–80; Ryan, Environmental
Federalism, supra note 134.
233
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devolves too much authority for efficient national governance235 or
has centralized beyond acceptable boundaries for local autonomy.236
Yet even mature unions face threatening disturbances in the federal
equilibrium, let alone those newly formed. Recent examples in
Canada, Iraq, Spain, and the United Kingdom demonstrate the
challenges of maintaining healthy unions amidst these competing
forces. While federalism has held some nations together against
regional cleavage, it can act as a double-edged sword in others, with
the potential to either relieve or exacerbate fragmentation.
1. Regional Marginalization in Québec and Kurdistan
The Canadian experience reveals how even an established federal
union is vulnerable to the forces of fragmentation. There, the narrow
failure of a popular referendum for secession in Québec—driven in
part by allegations of linguistic and cultural marginalization—
prompted the Canadian Supreme Court to analyze the secession issue
in light of the four implicit principles of the Canadian Constitution:
democracy, federalism, the rule of law, and the protection of
minorities.237
In a 1998 case frequently cited by constitutional scholars
worldwide, the Court held that according to these principles, a
territorial referendum could not allow unilateral secession without
constitutional amendment238—but that a successful referendum

235

See, e.g., sources cited supra note 147.
See, e.g., GREVE, supra note 189; see also RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 16, at
xviii–xxiii, 89–104 (discussing the contemporary Tea Party and Tenthers movements,
which critique the over-centralization of American governance and these movements
within the overall context of the New Federalism revival).
237 In re Secession of Québec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 292 (Can.).
[T]he Constitution is more than a written text. It embraces the entire global
system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of constitutional
authority. A superficial reading of selected provisions of the written
constitutional enactment, without more, may be misleading. It is necessary to
make a more profound investigation of the underlying principles animating the
whole of the Constitution, including the principles of federalism, democracy,
constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities. Those principles
must inform our overall appreciation of the constitutional rights and obligations
that would come into play in the event that a clear majority of Québecers votes
on a clear question in favour of secession.
Id.
238 Id. at 265.
The democratic principle identified above would demand that considerable
weight be given to a clear expression by the people of Québec of their will to
236
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would obligate the rest of Canada to engage with the dissenting
province to negotiate consensual solutions to the sources of
dissatisfaction.239 The decision left the nuances of such a process for
political actors to settle.240 Yet in recognizing the need for genuine,
interjurisdictional negotiation to address the concerns driving
separatism, the decision represents a sage approach to mediating the
competing themes of autonomy and interdependence on which strong
federalism is founded. The failure of the Québec secession movement
pleased some and disappointed others, but federalism has continued to
hold strong in Canada since the Supreme Court’s decision, in which
all sides found respect for their positions.
It is difficult to predict the course of another combustible secession
movement that continues to unfold in the semiautonomous Kurdistan
region of Iraq. There, the vast majority of voters recently endorsed
the creation of an independent Kurdish state, in a 2017 referendum
sponsored by the regional Kurdish government.241 In Iraq, the
creation of semiautonomous regional federalism has not quelled the
secede from Canada, even though a referendum, in itself and without more, has
no direct legal effect, and could not in itself bring about unilateral secession.
Id.
239

Id. at 266.
The clear repudiation by the people of Québec of the existing constitutional order
would confer legitimacy on demands for secession, and place an obligation on
the other provinces and the federal government to acknowledge and respect that
expression of democratic will by entering into negotiations and conducting them
in accordance with the underlying constitutional principles already discussed.

Id.
240

Id. at 221–22.
[I]n the event of demonstrated majority support for Québec secession, the content
and process of the negotiations will be for the political actors to settle. The
reconciliation of the various legitimate constitutional interests is necessarily
committed to the political rather than the judicial realm precisely because that
reconciliation can only be achieved through the give and take of political
negotiations.

Id.
241 See Martin Chulov, More than 92% of Voters in Iraqi Kurdistan Back
Independence, GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2017, 7:05 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world
/2017/sep/27/over-92-of-iraqs-kurds-vote-for-independence; Bethan McKernan, Kurdistan
Referendum Results: 93% of Iraqi Kurds Vote for Independence, Say Reports,
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 27 2017, 5:33 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world
/middle-east/kurdistan-referendum-results-vote-yes-iraqi-kurds-independence-iran-syria-a
7970241.html. Approximately seventy-two percent of 4.5 million registered voters turned
out for the referendum, held on September 25, 2017, and ninety-two percent voted “yes” in
answer to the question “Do you want the Kurdistan region and the Kurdistani areas outside
the administration of the Region to become an independent state?” McKernan, supra.
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impulse toward sovereign independence among its Kurdish
population. This may be because the Kurdish ethnic region extends
beyond the political borders of Iraq and into neighboring nations,
such as Turkey, but it may also reflect fresh memory of the genocidal
oppression of Iraqi Kurds under the Saddam Hussein regime.242
The independence vote in Iraqi Kurdistan prompted vehement
condemnation from the Iraqi central government,243 which later sent
military reinforcement into Kirkuk,244 and it was later rejected as
unconstitutional by the Iraqi Supreme Federal Court.245 The
referendum was also condemned by the Turkish government, which
feared that a Kurdish independence movement would exacerbate
Kurdish unrest within its own borders.246
Thus, while federalism can help assuage the forces of political
entropy, as it appears to have done in Canada, the Kurdish example
indicates that it may not always defeat them.
2. Devolution in the United Kingdom and Spain
Moreover, while federalism provides useful tools for mediating
these concerns, it may not be effective, or even appropriate, in every
historical context—especially those giving rise to deep national
anxiety over regional cohesiveness.

242

See MOHAMMED IHSAN, NATION BUILDING IN KURDISTAN: MEMORY, GENOCIDE,
HUMAN RIGHTS (2016) (analyzing the Kurdish independence movement in light of
the history of human rights atrocities against Kurds in Iraq).
243 McKernan, supra note 241; David Zucchino & Margaret Coker, Iraq Escalates
Dispute with Kurds After a Vote for Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2017, at A13.
244 Saeed Kamali Dehghan et al., Iraqi Forces Claim Rapid Progress in Operation to
‘Impose Security’ on Kirkuk, GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2017, 9:43 AM), https://www.the
guardian.com/world/2017/oct/16/iraqi-army-advances-kirkuk-kurds; David Zucchino,
Iraqis Capture Key Kurdish City with Little Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2017, at A1. A
month after the referendum, the Iraqi central government ordered the army into Kirkuk to
“impose security.” Dehghan et al., supra.
245 On November 6, 2017, Iraq’s Supreme Federal Court ruled that no region or
province can secede from the country. Iraq Court Rules No Region Can Secede After
Kurdish Independence Bid, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017, 6:03 AM), https://www.nytimes
.com/reuters/2017/11/06/world/middleeast/06reuters-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds.html. After
the failed referendum, the Kurdish regional president resigned his post. Margaret Coker,
Fallout in Kurds’ Independence Vote Claims Longtime President of Region, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2017, at A8.
246 Maher Chmaytelli & Ece Toksabay, Turkey Raises Oil Threat After Iraqi Kurds
Back Independence, REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2017, 6:06 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article
/us-mideast-crisis-kurds-referendum/turkey-raises-oil-threat-after-iraqi-kurds-back-inde
pendence-idUSKCN1C31U8.
AND
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It is here important to acknowledge the double-edged sword that
federalism implies under such circumstances. Federalism may provide
a safety valve that prevents regional tension from overcoming
national unity, but concern that full-blown federalism could
dangerously exacerbate fragmentation has led some nations to
experiment with less formal systems of pseudo-federal devolution.
For example, Great Britain and Spain, two longstanding European
nations, are both characterized by strong traditions of regional
governance without constitutionally formalized dual sovereignty.247
With only a single source of sovereign authority, these systems are
not technically federalism, but they represent another approach to
decentralizing regulatory decision-making in order to balance local
and national governance in a pluralist society. Scholars have noted
that decentralized governance offers many of the benefits claimed by
formal federalism,248 and it may be preferable to fully unitary or
disaggregated governance where full federalism is a poor fit.
Perhaps attesting to this, Great Britain allowed the possibility of
Scottish secession by popular referendum in 2014, but a majority of
Scottish voters preferred to remain a semiautonomous region within
the overall British union.249 Of note, the possibility of Scottish
independence induced the leaders of all three major parties at
Westminster to promise, ahead of the referendum, to devolve
additional authority to the Scottish Parliament, signaling the salience
of the local autonomy issue.250 Exactly which powers will be
devolved, and whether other British subdivisions should also have
more say over local laws, are both issues that remain undecided.251
247 Cf. Stephen Tierney, Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-State National Societies and
Contemporary Challenges to the Nation State, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 161, 169 (2005)
(“Sub-state forces, including sub-state national societies within plurinational states, have
in certain cases been able to negotiate degrees of autonomy within the State. The existence
of federal states is an obvious example of this process; but even in unitary States it has
been possible for sub-state national societies to secure levels of autonomy, even though in
unitary States, such as the U.K. and Spain, these measures of self-rule may not have been
formally entrenched in the State’s constitution.”).
248 See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 147.
249 Scottish Referendum: Scotland Votes ‘No’ to Independence, BBC NEWS (Sept. 19,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-29270441. The vote was 2,001,926 to
1,617,989 against Scottish secession, or 55.3% “No” to 44.7% “Yes.” Id.
250 Scottish Independence: Cameron, Miliband and Clegg sign ‘No’ Vote Pledge, BBC
NEWS (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-292134
18.
251 Devolution: After the Scottish Referendum, UK PARLIAMENT, http://www.parlia
ment.uk/business/publications/research/scotland-the-referendum-and-independence/devol
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Complicating matters, however, the British vote to exit the European
Union has reignited calls for Scottish independence252—and
potentially even Northern Irish secession from the United
Kingdom253—as distinctive regional groups navigate how their own
interests, economies, and identities align with the rest of Europe
versus the rest of Britain.
The British example shows that devolution can advance the
federalism value of enhancing local autonomy without requiring
formal federalism. Still, mere decentralization cannot protect the
check-and-balance values associated with local autonomy to the same
extent as constitutional federalism, with corresponding losses to the
availability of strong interjurisdictional competition, regulatory
backstop, and other related benefits of federalism.254 Some pseudofederal subdivisions have chafed against these limitations, urging
even greater powers of self-determination.
For example, ferocious political conflict has erupted between the
Spanish central government and regional separatists in the
autonomous community of Catalonia, whose quest for greater fiscal
and political autonomy intensified in 2013.255 The Spanish
Constitutional Court firmly rejected Catalonia’s bid for sovereign
autonomy in 2014, holding that sovereign authority rests only within
the central Spanish government,256 and that unilateral secession by
ution-after-the-scottish-referendum/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2017); see also England-Only
Votes: What Are the Options? BBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk
-politics-29292721 (discussing possibilities for more local autonomy for England and
other regions within the U.K.).
252 Katrin Bennhold, Amid Divisions in U.K. over ‘Brexit,’ Nicola Sturgeon Calls for
New Referendum on Scottish Independence, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/03/13/world/europe/scotland-referendum-independence.html. But see
Severin Carrell, Sturgeon Urged to Delay Scottish Independence Vote Until 2020s,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/oct/07
/sturgeon-urged-to-delay-scottish-independence-vote-until-2020s.
253 Sinn Fein Wants Vote on Northern Ireland Leaving UK ‘as Soon as Possible,’
REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2017, 10:29 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-nire
land/sinn-fein-wants-vote-on-northern-ireland-leaving-uk-as-soon-as-possible-idUSKBN
16K28M.
254 See supra notes 164–170 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of
regulatory backstop between opposing centers of sovereign power).
255 DECLARACÍO DE SOBIRANIA I DEL DRET A DECIDIR DEL POBLE DE CATALUNYANA
(Jan. 23, 2013), http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres_fsvp/docs/2013/01/23/20/58/033ae0d1-338c
-45d0-badf-dfdfbe4b0ede.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2016). In 2013, the Catalonian Generalitat
adopted the Declaration of Sovereignty and Right to Decide of the People of Catalonia. Id.
256 S.T.C., Mar. 25, 2014, (BOE-A-2014-3885, No. 042/2014) (Spain), http://hj.tribunal
constitucional.es/en/Resolucion/Show/23861 (“Article 1(2) of the Spanish Constitution
proclaims that ‘national sovereignty belongs to the Spanish people, from whom all State
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Catalonia would be unconstitutional.257 Catalonia nevertheless held a
popular referendum later that year, with over eighty percent voting for
secession—although the low voter turnout of only forty percent
clouded the significance of the outcome.258 In 2017, a second
referendum prompted violent clashes between Spanish police and
Catalonian voters attempting to cast ballots for independence.259 Of
six million eligible voters, only 2.26 million participated (a voter turnout that remained near forty-two percent), but the Catalonian
government reported that ninety percent voted for secession.260
The ballot triggered a standoff between the central government in
Madrid and regional Catalonian leaders that drew worldwide
attention. When Catalonian governor Charles Puigdemont waffled
between calls from his political base to formally declare
independence from Spain and calls from Madrid to affirm the Spanish
union, the Spanish government took steps to constitutionally revoke
the autonomous status of Catalonia.261 In late October, Madrid
invoked Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution and announced plans
to remove the Catalonian premier, his deputy, and other prosecessionist members of the Catalonian parliament from their

powers emanate’ . . . . [a]s in the current constitutional order only the Spanish People are
sovereign, exclusively and indivisibly, no other subject or State body or any part of the
people can be endowed with sovereign status by a public power.”).
257 Id. Because the Spanish Constitution declares that the unity of the regions under it is
indissoluble, unilateral secession by the people of Catalonia was impossible. Id. (“It may
therefore be inferred that in the constitutional order an Autonomous Community may not
unilaterally hold a referendum of self-determination in order to decide on its integration in
Spain.”).
258 Patrick Jackson, Catalonia Vote: No Smiles for Spain, BBC NEWS: INSIDE EUROPE
BLOG (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-eu-29994633 (reporting on the
outcome of the referendum).
259 Raphael Minder & Ellen Barry, Catalonia’s Independence Vote Descends into
Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2017, at A1.
260 Jon Sharman et al., Catalan Independence Referendum: Massive Majority Votes
‘Yes’, Regional Government Says, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 30, 2017, 4:01 PM), http://www
.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalan-referendum-live-updates-results-polls-spain
-catalonia-independence-votes-a7975901.html.
261 See Giles Tremlett, Puigdemont Speech Gives No Clarity on Catalan Independence,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2017, 4:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/10
/puigdemonts-speech-provides-no-clarity-on-catalan-independence; Ivanna Vallespín,
Puigdemont Letter Fails to Provide Clear Answer on Independence Declaration, EL PAÍS
(Oct. 16, 2017, 12:17 PM), https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/10/16/inenglish/1508138246
_000760.html.
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posts.262 Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of unionists took to the
streets of Barcelona to protest the Catalonian independence
movement and pledge their allegiance to a united Spain.263
Puigdemont fled to Belgium, while the Spanish central government
sought his extradition to stand trial for rebellion264 and scheduled new
Catalonian elections for December.265 As this article goes to press,
Spain is in turmoil, and the future resolution remains unclear.
D. Secession and the Morality of Inclusion
The movements for Catalonian and Kurdish independence are
ongoing, and while it seems unlikely that either will succeed in the
near term, it seems equally unlikely that either will be fully
extinguished any time soon. Unfolding simultaneously, the two
movements have revived international debate over the extent to which
secession should be an available remedy for resolving regional
conflict. Moreover, they provide a provocative contrast for assessing
the legitimacy of differing impetus for secession.
In both contexts, proponents argue that secession is justified by
cultural marginalization within the larger nation. Like the Kurds, who
suffered atrocities during the regime of Saddam Hussein from the
1980s into the early 2000s, Catalonian culture was repressed during
the Franco Regime that extended from the late 1930s to the mid
1970s.266 While the Kurds remain relatively isolated within Iraq,
however, the opponents of Catalonian secession argue that formerly
legitimate complaints cultural marginalization under Franco no longer
262 Anabel Díez & Juan José Mateo, Spanish PM Activates Article 155, Stripping
Powers of Catalan Government, EL PAÍS (Oct. 21, 2017, 3:44 PM), https://elpais.com
/elpais/2017/10/21/inenglish/1508587023_487115.html.
263 Tim Lister, Vasco Cotovio, & Angela Dewan, 300,000 Rally Against Catalan
Independence as Autonomy Stripped, CNN (Oct. 29, 2017, 1:14 PM), http://www.cnn
.com/2017/10/29/europe/catalonia-independence-spain/index.html.
264 James Badcock & James Crisp, Deposed Catalan Leader Carles Puigdemont
Released by Belgian Judge Pending Extradition Decision, Telegraph (Nov. 5, 2017, 11:42
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/05/deposed-catalan-leader-carles-puig
demont-turns-police/.
265 Sam Edwards, Spanish PM, in Catalonia, Calls for Big Turnout at December
Election, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2017, 6:25 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain
-politics-catalonia-rajoy/spanish-pm-in-catalonia-calls-for-big-turnout-at-december-elec
tion-idUSKBN1DC0ND.
266 See supra note 242 (discussing Kurdish oppression under Saddam Hussein); Omar
G. Encarnacion, The Ghost of Franco Still Haunts Catalonia, FOREIGN POLICY (Oct. 5,
2017, 10:13 AM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/05/sthe-ghost-of-franco-still-haunts
-catalonia/.
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apply, and that the modern secession movement is primarily an effort
to free wealthy Catalonia from financial obligations to the
economically struggling parts of Spain.267 They argue that in the near
half-century since Franco’s death in 1975, the Catalan language and
culture has flourished, and economic ties have deepened.268 Spanish
unionists insist that Catalonia remain part of a national community
bound together by ties of cultural, political, and economic
interdependence.
If accurate, these calls for national interdependence to override
Catalonian autonomy situates the Spanish conflict within a larger
international discourse about the responsibilities of those with means
towards those with less, especially under conditions of widening
wealth inequality.269 Similar themes are likely to animate future
contests between claims for autonomy and interdependence within
federal unions. They certainly operated in the British “Brexit”
decision to leave the European Union,270 and may in other unfolding
conflicts within the European Union and in other European
nations.271 As the Catalonian conflict exploded in 2017, northern
Italians in Lombardi and Veneto, Italy’s wealthiest regions, began
calling for their own independence as well, forthrightly over their

267 See, e.g., Gaspar Pericay Coll, The Reasons Behind Barcelona’s Massive
Demonstration for Catalonia’s Independence, CATALAN NEWS (Sept. 11, 2012, 6:29 PM),
http://www.catalannews.com/politics/item/the-reasons-behind-barcelonas-massive-demon
stration-for-catalonias-independence.
268 Id.
269 See, e.g., A Tale of Two Economies, ECONOMIST (May 16, 2015), http://www.econo
mist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21651261-north-limps-ahead-south-swoons-tale
-two-economies (discussing similar sentiments among northern Italians to “dump” the
southern part of the country, seen by some as a corrupt drain on the resources of the
wealthier northern region); Celestine Bohlen, North-South Divide in Italy: A Problem for
Europe, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/15/world
/north-south-divide-in-italy-a-problem-for-europe-too.html?mcubz=3.
270 See, e.g., Erlanger, supra note 1 (discussing motivating factors including British
nationalism, cultural independence, and anti-immigration sentiments); Q&A: What Britain
Wants From Europe, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-3
2695399 (discussing the possibility of British withdrawal from the E.U. over, in part,
reluctance to contribute to “Eurozone bailouts”).
271 See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Dutch Referendum on Pact with Ukraine Could Cause
Trouble for E.U., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2016, at A6 (discussing political tensions that could
lead the Netherlands to exit the E.U.); Bruno Waterfield, Dutch Would be ‘Better Off’ if
They Left the Euro, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 6, 2014, 11:05 AM), http://www.telegraph.co
.uk/finance/economics/10621264/Dutch-would-be-better-off-if-they-left-the-euro.html
(discussing economic benefits to the Dutch of leaving the E.U.).
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frustration at providing economic support to less prosperous regions
in southern Italy.272
These examples raise normative questions about the extent that
secession should be available as a remedy for regional division,
especially in the absence of extreme marginalization or abuses.
Scholars have long argued that economic self-interest alone provides
a weak claim for secession at best, and a morally dubious one at
worst. For example, Cass Sunstein has argued that “[s]elf-interest is
usually a controversial grounds for political action at the individual
level, unless translated into terms that invoke reasons other than selfinterest alone,” adding that “it is all the more difficult to support
secession of subunits on this ground.”273
Similarly, Allen Buchanan urges that appeals to both secession and
federalism can represent a moral regression, rather than moral
progress, if we fail to acknowledge our reciprocal obligations under
what he calls “the morality of inclusion.”274 He tempers his
enthusiasm for federalism as both an alternative to secession and a
framework for organizing sovereign authority if we fail to recognize
“that we have substantial obligations not to exclude others from
membership in political associations simply because doing so would
best further our own interests.”275 To preserve worthy federal systems
and pluralist societies threatened by these factors, the approach taken
by the Canadian Supreme Court—requiring interjurisdictional
negotiation to meaningfully address shared grievances276—is, at the
very least, a wise place to begin.
CONCLUSION: FEDERALISM AS A SWORD AND A SHIELD
Among comparative constitutional theorists, there are few more
incendiary topics than the debate over whether secession should be
more or less readily available. The question of how to govern pluralist
societies amidst the opposing forces of fragmentation and
272 Elisabetta Povoledo, Italian Regions of Lombardy and Veneto Vote for More
Autonomy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/world
/europe/lombardy-veneto-referendums.html.
273 Sunstein, supra note 203, at 659 (critiquing claims for secession on grounds of
economic self-interest).
274 Allen Buchanan, Federalism, Secession, and the Morality of Inclusion, 37 ARIZ. L.
REV. 53 (1995).
275 Id.
276 See supra notes 237–238 (discussing In re Secession of Québec, [1998] 2 S.C.R.
217, 232 (Can.)).
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centralization is equally compelling. Unfolding turmoil in nations as
disparate as Spain, Iraq, and the United Kingdom, let alone the
uncertainties facing the European Union, all prompt questions about
when subcommunities should be forced to stay part of a union they
wish to leave277—and perhaps even when subcommunities should be
able to remain part of a union that wishes to relinquish them.278 This
critical discourse should inspire all of us to think as carefully as
possible about how best to reconcile the claims for self-determination
that underlie secession movements with the competing claims for
regional interdependence that support national unity.
Claims for secession are especially persuasive in circumstances of
last resort, where extreme oppression, disenfranchisement, or
marginalization of a regional group within the overall nation has all
but extinguished the possibilities for negotiated resolution. Claims for
preserving national unity are also compelling, especially in
circumstances where regional departures portend other human rights
abuses, pose significant spillover effects, or where the proponents of
secession have benefited economically from a national partnership
from which the rest of the polity has yet to reap its reward. But when
secession cannot be justified or is otherwise politically unavailable,
federalism and other frameworks for decentralization provide
important tools for managing regional conflict within a pluralist
society.
As echoed by the Canadian Supreme Court’s Québec decision, the
dominant position in international law prefers federalism to secession
as a means of managing regional conflict (perhaps excepting
circumstances in which the principles of self-determination are
grossly violated by colonial exploitation, alien subjugation, or severe
repression).279 Ideally, federalism provides a means of enhancing
self-determination and resolving the impulses toward fragmentation
and political entropy that can pull states apart. Yet in some
circumstances, federalism poses a paradoxical risk. By providing
277 See, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede, 14
J. DEMOCRACY 5, 14 (2003) (arguing secession will not reduce conflict, violence, or
minority oppression as proponents hope, and generally dampens needed efforts toward
peaceful coexistence in inherently heterogenous polities).
278 See Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Forced Secessions, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
215, 219–20 (2017) (discussing whether the same principles of self-determination that
justify secession would enable one part of a larger union—for example, a former colony—
to remain part of the union even when the rest of the polity would have them go).
279 In re Secession of Québec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 232 (Can.).
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formal political autonomy to constituent groups that enhance their
identity as a distinct political community, federalism threatens to act
as a double-edged sword, creating a conduit toward the very claims
for secession it is designed to prevent.
In other words, federalism can be both a driver of claims to
secession as well as a safety valve against them. Had American
federalism not already identified the southern states as separate
political communities with a degree of sovereign authority, it would
likely have been more difficult for them to organize around the target
of secession during the U.S. Civil War. Federalism preserves,
encourages, and foments distinctive regional identity—in ways that
may seem threatening to nations in which regional tension is already
formidable. It is for this very reason that nations already worried
about regional conflict, such as the United Kingdom and Spain, have
been hesitant to adopt fully formalized federal arrangements. Yet the
Spanish example shows that even non-federal devolution can pose
similar risks.
Acknowledging that federalism can operate as both a sword that
instigates secession conflict and a shield against claims for secession
raises important questions for the architects of good governance
moving forward. Under what circumstances will it operate as more a
sword and more a shield? To be sure, the “sweet spot” that federalism
enables between claims for autonomy and claims for interdependence
will be different in each circumstance, hinging on the distinct history,
geography, culture, and demographics that distinguishes every nation
on earth—but for the sake of improved governance in the future, can
lessons of general applicability be coaxed from our present
experience?
To this end, future research should continue to query why different
models of devolved governance—and even different models of formal
federalism—work best in different contexts. Should the United
Kingdom retain its informal arrangement of asymmetrical devolution,
or should it move to a more formal symmetrical or even asymmetrical
form of federalism? Is there something distinctive about the U.S. and
Canadian experiences that justifies the different approaches the two
judicial systems have taken toward secession, in which the U.S.
courts have foreclosed the option, while the Canadian courts have left
it a comparatively (if weakly) open possibility? Is one approach likely
to produce better results over time, or does it hinge entirely on the
differences between these sibling nations, as closely related as they
are?
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Finally, this analysis forces us to confront the meta-level puzzle
about the degree to which the same pressures that make subnational
states inadequate units of governance for managing transboundary
problems also make larger nation-states inadequate governance units
for yet larger transboundary problems. Wicked conundrums like
climate change, international refugee crises, and international
criminal enterprises raise questions about when international
cooperation is required to deal with large-scale cross-jurisdictional
problems,280 and how these networks may further undermine national
power.
Indeed, many of the same factors that weaken subnational efforts to
govern transboundary problems render national efforts equally weak
at governing even bigger transboundary problems, at least when the
most important issue at hand is the transboundary-ness of the
problem.281 Transnational treaties, tribunals, trade compacts, and
other institutions have been created to deal with various economic,
environmental, public health, immigration, and terrorism-related
challenges in response to the failure of the old Westphalian
order282—and many of these have come under criticism for further
threatening the Westphalian order of distinctive nation-state identify
and self-determination as a means of achieving lasting peace and
stability.283
This dilemma is perhaps best exemplified by the widespread
grievances underlying the British vote to withdraw from the European
Union284—in which countless average Britons expressed dismay at
decisions affecting their daily lives being made by bureaucrats on the
mainland, for whom they had not voted, and whom they felt did not
280 Cf. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2009).
281 See SIMONA ŢUŢUIANU, TOWARDS GLOBAL JUSTICE: SOVEREIGNTY IN AN
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 43–94 (2013) (discussing the shift toward multilateral and
international responses to transboundary problems formerly handled exclusively by nation
states).
282 See List of International Institutions, GLOBAL INVENTORY OF STATISTICAL
STANDARDS, https://unstats.un.org/unsd/iiss/List-of-International-Organizations.ashx (last
visited Oct. 15, 2017), for a list of contemporary international institutions. See also John J.
Mersheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L SECURITY 5, 5
(1995), https://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0021.pdf (discussing various such
institutions).
283 See, e.g., Mersheimer, supra note 282 (critiquing international institutions at failing
to promote the objective of a peaceful international order).
284 See Erlanger, supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the Brexit vote).
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represent them or their interests.285 Even so, countervailing concerns
press on for more local governance—for example, the Brexit vote led
to renewed calls for Scottish independence286 and even the possibility
of Northern Irish secession from Britain—but in reunification with
the Irish Republic287—and so the dialectic continues to spin.
In the meanwhile, the American example and others throughout the
world continue to highlight the role of meaningful multilevel
governance in mediating these conflicts, even as we work out the
finer details of the analysis (if for no other reason than lack of a better
alternative). Effective systems of federalism, and other systems that
devolve authority to the level with appropriate capacity, cultivate a
healthfully dynamic regulatory regime in which local, regional, and
national perspectives are channeled toward decision-making realms in
which each best contributes to the overall goals of good governance.
The developed, modern framework offers useful tools for
understanding earlier chapters in American history, including the
American Revolution and Civil War, as well as ongoing federalism
controversies today. Meanwhile, our continual negotiation and
renegotiation of American federalism forces us to reckon with the
“morality of inclusion” on an ongoing basis.
The processes of competition, collaboration, and negotiation by
which American federalism diffuses regional tension today are among
its most important features, and they have surely helped galvanize the
Union against further efforts to disassociate its many moving parts.
To the extent that other nations face similar challenges, the ongoing
285 See, e.g., Carmen Fishwick, Meet 10 Britons who Voted to Leave the EU,
GUARDIAN (June 25, 2016, 9:45 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/25
/meet-10-britons-who-voted-to-leave-the-eu (“For me it was all about sovereignty, the
ability to make our own decisions and not be ruled by the faceless, non-elected bureaucrats
in Brussels; not to be frogmarched into ever greater political union and the creation of a
European superstate which no one ever sought my opinion over. It was about regaining
control over our own borders and regaining a say into our own destiny.”); Daniel Hannan,
The Case Against Europe: One MEP Reveals the Disturbing Contempt for Democracy at
the Heart of the EU, DAILYMAIL (Aug. 14, 2012, 6:04 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk
/news/article-2188453/The-case-Europe-MEP-Daniel-Hannan-reveals-disturbing-con
tempt-democracy-heart-EU.html (presaging the later Brexit vote in arguing that “the EU is
contemptuous of public opinion — not by some oversight, but as an inevitable
consequence of its supra-national nature”).
286 See, e.g., Lyndsie Bourgon, Brexit Has Brought the Idea of Scottish Independence
Back from the Dead, ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/interna
tional/archive/2017/04/scotland-sturgeon-may-brexit-britain-independence/523623/.
287 See, e.g., Vicent Boland, Brexit Brings Irish Reunification Back into the Spotlight,
FIN. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/7a48e040-0d67-11e7-b030-768
954394623.
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American experiment still holds instructional value. And just as
surely, Americans will continue to learn from the experience of other
pluralist societies as we continue to seek the evolving and dynamic
“sweet spot” between meaningful autonomy and healthful
interdependence.
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